

PART 2

**THE
STRUCTURAL
CHANGES
NEEDED**

4 Strategy

Part 1 of this Report outlined the history of reviews and reports that have considered Queensland Police Service (QPS) responses to domestic and family violence. Recommendations made over time included those intended to strengthen the capability, capacity and structure of the QPS to respond to domestic and family violence. Despite those recommendations, the problem of inconsistent and, at times, inadequate police responses continues.

The previous chapter examined some of the challenges that confront the QPS leadership’s efforts to improve the way it responds to domestic and family violence. This includes its membership’s sense of abandonment by the leadership in its efforts to translate the leadership’s stated commitment to responding to domestic and family violence into practice, because appropriate resources have not been provided to allow that to occur.

This chapter considers the clear evidence that this lack of leadership extends to a failure to have developed a standard, uniform mechanism to measure the organisational impact of responding to domestic and family violence. The implementation of such a mechanism is a critical step towards properly understanding the resources needed to support the frontline response to domestic and family violence. Without it, the QPS will be unable to plan the resources and structures necessary for officers to respond effectively to domestic and family violence.

This chapter also considers the structure and resourcing of the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command (Command) which houses the strategic capability of the QPS to respond to domestic and family violence. The Command is presently under-resourced and has been since its establishment in February 2021. If the Command is to provide strategic direction to guide the organisation’s response to domestic and family violence, the QPS must commit considerable additional resources to it.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

THE STRUCTURE OF THE QPS

A brief overview of the structure of the QPS provides the context of the importance of organisational planning to ensure the QPS membership is well-equipped to respond appropriately to domestic and family violence.

The QPS is divided into seven regions. Each region is split into districts (15 in total) and each district is further broken down into police stations.¹ There are four Deputy Commissioners, and each is responsible for one of four portfolios: Regional Queensland; Southern Queensland; Crime, Counter-Terrorism and Specialist Operations; and Strategy and Corporate Services.

The Office of State Discipline is a separate unit and reports directly to the Police Commissioner. The following organisational chart provides an overview of this structure:





Commissioner of Police




Figure 15: QPS organisational structure as at September 2021 available on the QPS website

The Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command is located within Crime, Counter-Terrorism and Specialist Operations. It houses the strategic capability of the QPS to respond to domestic and family violence and its purpose is “to develop, enhance and support QPS capability to prevent, disrupt, investigate and respond to domestic and family violence and harm to vulnerable persons.”²

Operationally, at the district level, the QPS adopts a decentralised approach to policing domestic and family violence, with regions calling on the expertise of specialised units as necessary, such as when a homicide occurs.³ A decentralised police response acknowledges, and attempts to account for, the diversity of population, services and geography across the state.

To support its response to domestic and family violence, the QPS has a range of specialist positions and units in each district, including Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators, and Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Units.

These specialist resources are delivered through a partnership model between the strategic capability responsibility of the Command and the operational capability within each of the districts.⁴ The specialist resources are considered in further detail in the next chapter.

CURRENT STRATEGY FOR MEETING INCREASING DEMAND

Following the recommendations made in the report of the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland (2015), the QPS committed to enhancing its responses to domestic and family violence in successive whole of government action plans and organisational strategies under the broader *Queensland Domestic and Family Violence Prevention Strategy 2016-2026*.⁵

Various action plans and organisational strategies have resulted in numerous initiatives designed to meet the demand of responding to domestic and family violence. For example, the most recent *Third Action Plan of the Domestic and Family Violence Prevention Strategy 2019-20 to 2021-22* committed the QPS to embedding a Cultural Change Program to promote best practice policing strategies to respond to domestic and family violence.⁶

The current QPS *Domestic and Family Violence Strategy 2021-2023* includes a commitment to deliver victim-centric, trauma-informed responses to domestic and family violence. This strategy aims to drive continual improvement, best practice and an integrated QPS-wide agenda to reduce domestic and family violence and make Queensland the safest state. It describes the QPS as:

- Maturing in its specialist investigative capabilities, and is focused on building its understanding of, and specialist capability in, identifying perpetrators and ensuring they are held to account.
- Committed to delivering a strong and supportive organisational environment that acknowledges and addresses the seriousness and complexity of domestic and family violence and builds a culture that rejects myths and negative attitudes about domestic and family violence.

- Confronted with the volume and complexity of domestic and family violence related calls for service, and the associated impact on frontline officers exposed to traumatic events and violence as part of their day-to-day work.
- Seeking to strengthen the relationship between police and marginalised groups and acknowledges that the misidentification of the person most in need of protection can lead to adverse criminal justice outcomes, is a form of systems abuse, and disproportionately impacts First Nations women.⁷

THE GREENFIELD REVIEW

In 2019, the QPS commissioned the Queensland *Police Service Strategic Review*, also known as the Greenfield Review, to examine the challenges associated with its current operating environment, identify avenues to improve service delivery and to build future capacity.⁸

Although the Greenfield Review did not specifically examine the organisation’s responses to domestic and family violence, it identified a range of service delivery challenges relevant to the Commission’s terms of reference, including:⁹

- inadequate monitoring and support of the mental health of police personnel, and deficiencies in fatigue management
- resourcing allocations inconsistent with demand across the state
- policies and practices that negatively impacted the ability of divisions to meet demand
- a disconnect from local priorities, which created a divisive environment, perceptions of discrepancies in budget allocations, and a lack of accountability in the delivery of targets
- perceptions of an inequitable workload for general duties officers, who were often diverted to duties that could be completed by unsworn officers (such as front-counter duties)
- excessive administrative activities undertaken by sworn officers, particularly general duties officers, who also felt undervalued
- a perception that there was a lack of understanding of policing challenges outside of South-East Queensland.

The Greenfield Review made 22 recommendations across a range of priority areas to:

- support a more connected and engaged workforce¹⁰
- provide responsive local solutions intended to maximise efficiency and effectiveness¹¹
- improve the allocation of resources across the service commensurate with demand¹²
- establish a connected, transparent approach to organisational performance management with effective governance arrangements¹³
- focus on implementation.¹⁴

In 2020, the QPS executive approved the Service Delivery Redesign Project (SDRP)¹⁵ to establish a new model for service delivery, arising from the Greenfield Review. The SDRP’s purpose was to reduce pressure on the frontline, distribute workload more equally and improve job satisfaction. The trial first commenced in the Moreton District in February 2021.

Assistant Commissioner Cameron Harsley APM referred to improvements made to service delivery in the Moreton District as a result of the SDRP trial, as evidenced by the following statistics:¹⁶

- initial investigations requiring rework decreased from 43% to 10%
- 64% of domestic and family violence investigations were completed within ten days, compared to 43% previously
- the median length of investigations was eight days, whereas previously it was 21 days
- Code 1, 2 and 3 response times improved with 90% of Code 1 and 94% of Code 2 calls being attended to within 12 minutes. Code 3 jobs were attended to in under 20 minutes, where it previously may have taken over an hour.

Despite those statistics, and the work of the QPS in implementing the Greenfield Review recommendations more broadly, many QPS members continue to feel that the resources necessary to respond to domestic and family violence are inadequate, and that the SDRP reforms have not provided adequate assistance.

The Police Commissioner recognised this dissatisfaction, when asked about the SDRP at a public hearing on 18 August 2022, noting there was limited collaboration with the QPS membership about it:

...there were many learnings for us. I think as an organisation we went in quite quickly and told the members that this was happening. They felt - although we thought, you know, everyone understood the model and this is what happens, it was difficult because they felt that it was being done to them rather than a partnership model.¹⁷

In its submissions, the QPS noted that transformational business change such as the SDRP cannot be achieved overnight.

The Queensland Police Union of Employees (QPUE) provided information to the Commission that they had “received a significant number of complaints from members in relation to the SDRP in the Moreton District.”¹⁸ One of the main concerns the QPUE had been advised of was the “failure of the implementation team to genuinely engage with the staff.”¹⁹

In that regard, the Commission heard from officers who expressed discontent with the trial. In particular they perceived that there was a lack of understanding from the QPS leadership about frontline policing and under-resourcing. One QPS member said:

It’s also very clear that the higher ranking executive level have lost touch with real policing, the newly trotted out SDRP is a horrendous model of policing. The QPS does not have the numbers to support such a model, complaints were voiced in Moreton region but ignored by the executive as they pushed the model out. That 8 month pause the commissioner mentioned in her evidence was

because of the many many complaints by officers in Moreton about the ineffectiveness of the model and how it was causing a high amount of mental fatigue amongst officers.²⁰

Similar sentiments were expressed by QPS members in free text responses to the 2021 Working for Queensland survey:²¹

[There] is little communication with the troops on the ground and we are just told to ‘make it work’, regardless of identified issues from the lowest levels.

I am very concerned about the direction of the QPS and the information coming directly out of the Moreton District from officers on the ground seems to be being ignored by the ELT (Executive Leadership Team) with respect to the trial of the SDRP.

The SDRP within Moreton District does not appear to be working as well as intended. It appears to me that the issue is numbers of officers. Due to the new system, there is a clear lack of proactive Policing on the roads. Policing appears to be reactive based on calls for service instead of proactive. There is a clear lack of crews on the road out looking for and preventing crime.

SDRP at Moreton is a great example of what happens regularly where the true feeling at the coal face is not expressed fully and honestly by the respective leaders - then everyone is surprised when morale drops and sick leave rises.

The conditions currently in the Moreton District CPIU, as a result of SDRP, are the worst I have experienced. This relates to moral[e], uncertainty in roles (rotation policy), severe under resourcing of staff, lack of development opportunity, lack of supervision for junior PC’s, creation of a silo effect with other units resulting in decrease[d] inter-unit cohesion.

The SDRP has ruined Moreton District. The QPS has created a new section (Volume Crime) and picked officers/ forced officers to work in these positions from their respected substantive positions. This leaving the other sections understaffed and unable to effectively, professionally and timely complete their core business. There is a massive culture problem within Moreton District.

Having considered the issues with the Moreton District trial, the QPS recently launched a new service delivery model in Logan in mid-August 2022 following significant engagement with that district.

On 18 August 2022, the Police Commissioner gave evidence to the Commission that, although the model had only been in operation for a short time, she had been told by a Deputy Commissioner who had visited Logan that he was “ecstatic” with the feedback from officers.²²

However, the Commission has heard the new model has received a mixed response in Logan. QPS members who participated in the Working for Queensland Survey stated:

I have no faith in the SDRP changes, but I believe it is another unfit system they will force upon the organisation.

SDRP will fail here simply we do not have the numbers to make it work, this area has never been supported with decent equipment and resources.²³

Overall, and more broadly across the organisation, the frustration of the membership with the inability of the QPS to respond to current demand pressures was also relayed to the Commission by Mr Mark Ainsworth. Mr Ainsworth, a retired Detective Superintendent engaged to conduct interviews to gauge QPS members’ views of various matters including resourcing for domestic and family violence, told the Commission that QPS members told him about a worsening culture towards domestic and family violence:

...it also involved a level of frustration in that the apparent lack of resources to properly deal with DV, to undertake a proper investigation, because the numbers of DVs backing up going from DV to DV it led to quite an extreme level of frustration which they believe that until some of those issues were addressed, you know, streamlining processes, looking at appropriate resourcing, that the culture may struggle to improve.²⁴

As observed in the previous chapter, the QPS membership is concerned about inadequate resources for responding to domestic and family violence across the state rather than only in the Moreton and Logan districts.

The QPUE shares these concerns. Mr Ian Leavers, President of the QPUE, submitted to the Commission that officers are inadequately trained, insufficiently resourced and face competing time pressures and responsibilities which collectively impede their capacity to effectively respond to domestic and family violence.²⁵

The QPUE submission further stated that:

...there are vastly insufficient resources available to ensure the proper policing of domestic and family violence matters. This has been an issue for many years and largely ignored by those responsible for seeking and granting funding.²⁶

MEASURING DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE DEMAND

Previous reviews and findings have recommended that the QPS implement measures to respond more effectively to existing and future demands for domestic and family violence. For example, both the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland²⁷ and the QPS *Domestic and Family Violence Culture Review* (2019)²⁸ identified the need for the QPS to ensure that staffing and resourcing allocations were commensurate with demand across the state.

Despite these previous recommendations, there is still no standard, uniform measure in place to assess the impact of domestic and family violence work on police time and resources. Without accurate and comprehensive data, the QPS is unable to identify and allocate appropriate resources to deliver its services.

While the Commission accepts that the QPS is facing significant demand pressures in responding to domestic and family violence, and that it is very likely that current resourcing allocations are inadequate to properly meet the demand for services, there is no single source of data that provides an accurate or consistent measure of the time spent by officers in responding to domestic and family violence.

If the QPS is unable to measure the demand created by domestic and family violence, it will continue to be ill equipped to accurately make a case for increased resources or plan for future needs.

ESTIMATES OF POLICE TIME SPENT ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE

The Commission’s investigation of the capacity of the QPS to respond to domestic and family violence related demand pressures was impeded by poor quality data and reporting.

For example, in 2021, the QPS told the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce that “approximately 40% of all police time is expended responding to and investigating domestic and family violence.”²⁹

An illustration of the lack of certainty surrounding QPS measurements of the demand of domestic and family violence can be seen in the QPS response to the Commission for clarification with respect to the figure of 40%. In response to a request for clarification, the QPS provided the Commission with additional data about the total average time spent by officers on domestic and family violence matters.³⁰ The QPS reported that in 2021-2022, 56% of general duties officers’ time was spent responding to calls for service, with the remainder of their rostered time spent performing other police functions and duties. Twenty-seven percent of the time responding to calls for service was spent on domestic and family violence calls for service, accounting for approximately 15% of general duties officers’ total time.

In terms of volume, domestic and family violence related matters made up 14% of all calls for service.³¹ However, this data only related to time spent responding to calls for service and does not give an accurate estimate of the overall time officers spend on domestic and family violence. In this respect, it does not provide a useful measurement of the actual demand on the QPS.

Moreover, while the QPS has previously publicly reported that approximately 40% of all police time is spent responding to domestic and family violence,³² it now appears the QPS no longer considers this estimate is accurate. In early August 2022, a briefing note provided to the Police Commissioner informed her that the organisation was, by then, “*unclear as to the source of the 40% figure.*”³³

Later in August 2022, the Commission received further data from the QPS which included a measure of hours police spend attending to domestic and family violence calls for service.³⁴ It estimated that the QPS spends approximately 15.5% of total police officer strength, equivalent to 1,978 full time members, responding to “*domestic and family violence victims and system.*”³⁵

This may be a better measurement of demand as it reflects the investment of time and resourcing by police for additional tasks outside of the initial call for service such as data entry, investigations, watchhouse management, police referrals, prosecutions and by specialist officers. However, the organisation needs to decide how to measure its response to domestic and family violence and what these measurements mean for improving practice and informing decision-making, as well as how to communicate them to the public.

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE RELATED CALLS FOR SERVICE

To better understand demand on the QPS, the Commission requested the assistance of the Queensland Government Statistician’s Office to analyse data provided by the QPS in relation to domestic and family violence related calls for service.

This data shows that domestic and family violence related occurrences have more than doubled from 60,426 in 2012 to 137,936 in 2021. Over the same period, the rate of domestic and family violence related occurrences grew from 1,323 to 2,623 per 100,000 persons (see Figure 16 below).

This suggests that increases in the number of domestic and family violence related occurrences recorded by police cannot be explained by population growth alone. In addition, the data also showed that in 2012-2013 there were 290 operational staff per 100,000 people and in 2020-2021, 285 operational staff per 100,000 people.³⁶ Acknowledging that police work is so much more than responding solely to domestic and family violence, these figures suggest that growth in police numbers has not kept pace with the increasing demand for domestic and family violence within the QPS.

Increased calls for service do not necessarily reflect an increase in domestic and family violence within the Queensland community, but instead may be driven by a variety of factors including:

- improved reporting, community awareness and information sharing
- a broader definition of domestic and family violence within the *Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012* (DFVPA)
- a shift to a more proactive, policing response to domestic and family violence as recommended by the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence (2015)
- the introduction of a default term of five years for Protection Orders.

Also, while this data reflects actions taken by police in responding to domestic and family violence related calls for service, it does not account for the complexities and individual requirements of each job. Some calls for service can be resolved relatively quickly, and others take far longer.

The Commission repeatedly heard that domestic and family violence calls for service can take significant time, particularly where a Police Protection Notice is issued or an application for a Protection Order is required.³⁷ The Commission heard that while occurrences may take approximately two hours to complete on average, they can take longer depending on the situation, from four hours up to an entire shift.³⁸




Figure 16: Number and rate of Domestic and Family Violence Occurrences³⁹

For these reasons, this data does not provide a definitive measurement of the demand of domestic and family violence on the QPS.

SERVICE DELIVERY STATEMENT MEASURES

All Queensland Government agencies, including the QPS, are required to provide a Service Delivery Statement (SDS) to the Queensland Treasurer for consideration in the annual state budget allocation.

The SDS includes service standards for the QPS, including targets for property security, personal safety and good order offences. These targets measure the percentage of offences cleared within 30 days. The SDS also sets targets for crime victimisation, youth crime reoffending, response times to Code 1 and Code 2 callouts and reduction in road fatalities and hospitalisations.⁴⁰

While they are reported annually to government, SDS measures and service standards are also meant to be incorporated into operational planning, and other internal organisational planning and reporting. They define an appropriate and expected level of performance for agencies and provide a framework to assess the effective and efficient delivery of services by that agency.⁴¹

Despite the Police Commissioner stating publicly on 29 June 2022 that domestic and family violence is “*by far the most complex issue that we deal with on a daily basis*,”⁴² there is no reference to a service standard target for domestic and family violence in the SDS. When asked, at a public hearing, why that is so, the Police Commissioner gave evidence that there were “*no formal mechanisms*” for measuring success in this area.⁴³

The Police Commissioner gave evidence that some QPS districts use certain data to measure success in policing domestic and family violence, however the approach varied across Queensland with no single state-wide standard or target.⁴⁴

In an environment of insufficient resourcing, multiple competing demands, and an absence of clear performance measures for domestic and family violence, there is a real risk that police will prioritise meeting established SDS targets for other offences over and above responding to domestic and family violence calls for service.

Moreover, the omission of a service standard for domestic and family violence means that the QPS is not accountable to the Queensland Government in relation to its responses to domestic and family violence in the same way that it is for other offences. The Queensland Government’s guide to the development of service delivery statements reinforces the importance of being able to measure organisational performance:

Knowing how well an agency is currently performing against its objectives is essential to allow it to determine if it needs to alter its strategies or policies or re-evaluate its objectives to ensure value is delivered to its customers, stakeholders and the community.⁴⁵

The absence of a domestic and family violence service standard also sends a message within the organisation that domestic and family violence policing is not valued in the same way as other policing activities. In turn, this impacts resourcing allocation and promotional opportunities for staff who routinely respond to domestic and family violence or work in specialist domestic and family violence roles.

APPROACHES TO MEASURING DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE DEMAND IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The Commission has considered the approach taken by other jurisdictions in assessing domestic and family violence related demand.

In New South Wales, police responses to domestic and family violence were recently audited by the State’s Auditor General. The audit identified that the NSW Police Force’s central domestic and family violence policy team is not resourced to monitor domestic and family violence practices or ensure the Force’s initiatives are consistently implemented across the state.⁴⁶ It also identified that there is scope for the NSW Police Force to enhance its monitoring, reporting and analysis of a broader range of domestic and family violence performance activities.⁴⁷

Part of that audit focused on domestic violence performance reporting.⁴⁸ The NSW Police Force uses the Command Performance Assessment System (COMPASS) to monitor its performance against its wider business plan and performance targets. There are seven indicators within COMPASS that relate to domestic and family violence, though they relate to event types rather than police performance. The report noted:

The target used by the NSW Police Force to measure its performance is focused on legal action rates for apprehended domestic violence order breaches. That is, charges resulting from reported breaches of these orders. In 2020–21, the NSW Police Force achieved a legal action rate of apprehended domestic violence orders of 84 per cent against a target of 82 per cent.⁴⁹

Victoria has developed performance measures in its five year police strategy *Policing Harm, Upholding the Right: Victoria Police Strategy for Family Violence, Sexual Offences and Child Abuse 2018-2023*. It established performance measures under four strategic priorities: Victim safety; Offence and offender management; Child safety; and Our people. This includes measures that assess victim experiences, police activity, population rates and hours of family violence education delivered to police.

In Victoria Police annual reports, crimes against property and crimes against the person are split between family violence related crimes and all other crimes to provide greater transparency in reporting.⁵⁰

A review of the New South Wales and Victorian approaches demonstrate that measuring domestic and family violence can be achieved. It is unsatisfactory that the QPS is unable to accurately measure the demand on its resources, or the effectiveness of its responses, because it will continue to be unable to strategically plan for the resources necessary to respond until it does. A recommendation that the QPS devise a mechanism for doing so is made at the end of this chapter.

THE DOMESTIC, FAMILY VIOLENCE AND VULNERABLE PERSONS COMMAND

In February 2021, Ms Doreen Langham was killed by her former male intimate partner during a prolonged episode of domestic and family violence. It quickly became apparent that the QPS had made several fundamental errors in its responses to Ms Langham's requests for police assistance prior to her death.⁵¹

On 26 February 2021, within days of Ms Langham's death, the Police Commissioner announced the establishment of a new Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command to meet the ongoing demands of responding to domestic and family violence.⁵²

Following an extraordinary meeting of the QPS Executive Leadership Team that day, the previous Domestic and Family Violence, Vulnerable Persons Unit transitioned into a stand-alone command under the Crime, Counter-Terrorism and Specialist Operations portfolio, and was renamed the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command.⁵³

The Command initially operated from substantially the same resourcing allocation as the previous Domestic and Family Violence, Vulnerable Persons Unit, which had been established in 2015 as part of the implementation of recommendations in the report of the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence (2015).⁵⁴

On 18 August 2022, the Police Commissioner gave evidence to the Commission that the initial mandate of the new Command was:

[t]o lead at a strategic level the implementation of reviews and changes to our systems, training and processes, and to ensure previous recommendations in relation to the way we deal with domestic and family violence are correctly implemented.⁵⁵

The current QPS *Domestic and Family Violence Strategy 2021-23* states that the Command is responsible for setting the overarching strategic direction for the police response to domestic and family violence as well as driving implementation of policing strategies and capability enhancements for the prevention, disruption, response to, and investigation of domestic and family violence incidents.⁵⁶

INADEQUACY OF THE COMMAND'S RESOURCES

While the establishment of the Command may have created the impression of a significant additional investment of new resources by the QPS, only three temporary positions, the roles of an Assistant Commissioner, Strategy and Performance Inspector and an Executive Assistant, were approved for the creation of a Command office.⁵⁷ All other positions were pre-existing roles from the previous Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Unit.

The Command is responsible for domestic and family violence, mental health, referrals, White Ribbon accreditation, Victims Assist Queensland and elder abuse and disabilities.⁵⁸ It has a research arm, although this is currently staffed by only one research officer, with another to be appointed soon. The Command has a full cohort of 27 positions, although many of those are not filled or are temporarily filled.⁵⁹ Currently there are nine staff attached to the Command with responsibility for domestic and family violence projects and initiatives.⁶⁰ The Command also has line control of six Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators who are situated in the Brisbane Police Communications Centre and are responsible for providing operational advice and assistance in real time.

Members of the Command have encountered difficulties created by temporary appointments,⁶¹ as constant staff changes disrupt continuity in projects and initiatives and impacts workforce stability.

There are two positions dedicated to the role of 'Principal Program Coordinator'. One coordinator commenced in the position when the role was not completely developed and she was unsure what the job would entail. She has since spent significant time reporting on the developments following the recommendations in the report of the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland (2015).⁶² She noted that since May 2022, she has worked under three different Inspectors as that role was temporary. This has meant that ideas have changed regularly and there are limited resources to undertake new projects.⁶³

The second coordinator is the only staff member dedicated to strategic initiatives within the Command. Currently, there are six major strategic initiatives which she oversees including the Video Recorded Evidence Pilot, and the Embedded Officer Pilot. She has no support staff and delegating tasks is difficult, as others in the Command have their own responsibilities. By contrast, she understands that, at the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, her counterpart on the Video Recorded Evidence Pilot has at least five support staff assigned.⁶⁴

Other positions in the Command include a Superintendent, two Inspectors, and a research officer. Though the staff at the Command are hardworking and passionate, their roles do not allow them to focus solely on, or prioritise, domestic and family violence initiatives and strategy. For example, a portion of the role of the Superintendent is dedicated to supporting the Assistant Commissioner's tasks, supporting staff, reviewing significant events and undertaking reactionary responses to those events. One of the Inspectors oversees human resource management.

A common sentiment expressed by the staff in the Command is that they are unable to be forward facing or focus on strategic responses to domestic and family violence as they do not have the resources to do so. Members of the Command noted the following:⁶⁵

- their work is mostly reactive, rather than proactive
- a lot of ad-hoc work is done by the Command, which gives little time to do strategic work. There is no time for forward-focused, strategic thinking or planning
- the role of the Command is to provide high level strategic direction, but with the current resources and staffing, they cannot do this
- the strategic capability of the Command needs to be appropriately resourced. At least four extra members are required in the domestic and family violence area of the Command alone, as well as extra research officers
- an additional 11 to 12 positions to undertake project work would assist
- there should be more resources at the Command to do the necessary preparatory work, as presently there are ideas for projects which are unable to be done.

The QPS Executive Leadership Team (ELT) is aware of these problems but was slow to meaningfully address the situation.⁶⁶ Records indicate that Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, who is in charge of the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command, advised the ELT of resourcing problems on numerous occasions since the Command's establishment.

In March 2021, Assistant Commissioner Codd provided an overview of the Command to the ELT, noting it was established through existing resources and zero growth.⁶⁷ In May 2021, Assistant Commissioner Codd raised the under-resourcing of the Command as an issue to the ELT, including the temporary nature of the positions in the Command.⁶⁸

The Police Commissioner was present for both these presentations, though she gave evidence to the Commission at a public hearing that she did not specifically recall the Command's under-resourcing being raised.⁶⁹ Permanent staffing of the Command was requested and approved in June 2021,⁷⁰ but the allocation of those positions did not commence until January 2022 and was still occurring in October 2022.

Assistant Commissioner Codd raised the under-resourcing of the Command on several occasions with the relevant Deputy Commissioner, Tracy Linford APM, between at least July and October 2021.⁷¹ He repeatedly raised concerns that the Command was struggling under the enormous and unsustainable pressure placed on it.

Despite these multiple representations, additional resources were not allocated to the Command.⁷² As a consequence, there has been a need to continually balance competing priorities within the Command.

A Workforce Allocation Subcommittee request for a further position in the Command was made in August 2022 and approved in September 2022. QPS submissions advised the Commission that a recent external review of the resourcing of the Command had resulted in some further positions being recommended for the Command.

The Command is limited in its scope in other ways. It is not responsible for all specialist domestic and family

violence officers within the organisation. While it guides and supports the delivery of operational policing responses, frontline activities are the responsibility of each police district.

Apart from High Risk Teams (which are hosted at district level but managed centrally by the Command) and Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators within the Brisbane Communications Centre, domestic and family violence specialist officers and units are district resources.⁷³ A QPS member identified that resources across the districts vary. They said:

... the Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, who was appointed to lead and stand up the DFV Command within the QPS, went around the state to understand how each region is working on DFV. The Command does not have a unified or centralised corporate approach, the district and regions devise their own format for responding to DFV, and each varies, and this was widely apparent during the QPS DFV Conference undertaken in 2021.⁷⁴

The QPS Board of Management was made aware of the challenges created for the Command by this dual reporting structure as early as June 2021 (within six months of its establishment).⁷⁵ This included that the *"strategic responsibility for DFV and VP policing is spread across various domains, with policy discussions and implementation embedded in multiple Commands and Divisions"*. It was also noted that:

The temporary QPS staffing model for DFV & VP policing (current temporary staff cohort of 61%), owing to frequent staff turnover and loss of vital corporate knowledge resulting from short-term secondment periods, has made it extraordinarily difficult to embed positive, long term cultural change and build lasting internal and external relationships.⁷⁶

Assistant Commissioner Codd gave evidence at a public hearing of the need to balance the delivery of enhancements to the frontline with investment in strategy, processes and procedural changes which will deliver benefits in the longer term.⁷⁷ The Assistant Commissioner subsequently agreed that the sheer number of issues that the QPS, and now the Command, has carriage of makes it difficult for the Command to focus on future initiatives when there are so many other urgent priorities and emerging crises.⁷⁸

Women's Legal Service Queensland submitted that the Command was *"grossly under resourced, and under filled."*⁷⁹ Despite the evidence of Assistant Commissioner Codd, in its submission the QPS did not initially accept that the Command lacked capacity to meet its strategic objectives. Rather, it sought to minimise the under-resourcing by highlighting the Command's reliance on other commands with subject matter expertise, in order to achieve its strategic priorities.⁸⁰

Reliance on other commands means the Command must compete for priority and resources against other portfolios, which in itself can be time-consuming. The limited size and capability of the Command also reinforces its lack of prioritisation within the broader organisational structure.

Subsequent to the QPS submission being received by the Commission, the Police Commissioner was recalled to give evidence on 5 and 6 October 2022. Ultimately, she accepted that the Command is significantly under-resourced and has been since its establishment.⁸¹

After the Police Commissioner's first appearance at a Commission hearing on 18 August 2022, the Commission received advice that a commitment had been made within the QPS to undertake an external review of the Command.⁸²

Following the Police Commissioner's second appearance before the Commission on 5 and 6 October 2022, she met with Assistant Commissioner Codd on 10 October 2022 and advised the external review of the Command's resourcing would be expedited.

The external review's findings and recommendations were provided to the Police Commissioner on 13 October 2022. The reviewer sought to make the Police Commissioner "*aware of some areas under stress that would greatly benefit with some immediate injection of resources.*"⁸³ One of the findings was that instability and "*churn*" created confusion and a lack of shared purpose in the Command, which could be rectified by permanent appointments. Another finding was that the position descriptions of some staff within the Command are not consistent with the functions relating to their roles.

The Commission was advised that by 13 October 2022, "*22 additional permanent resources*" within the Command had been approved.⁸⁴ However, of those 22 positions, only four are allocated to the domestic and family violence business unit responsible for strategic development.⁸⁵ Six positions relate to temporary training positions already in existence (but being converted to permanent roles) and five positions are dedicated to High Risk Teams.⁸⁶

INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT STRUCTURE

Importantly, the Command does not have an internal intelligence capacity and there appears to be no established mechanism in place for relevant intelligence reports completed by other sections of the QPS to be provided to the Command to inform its decision making.⁸⁷

During Assistant Commissioner Codd's evidence on 11 July 2022, the Commission identified that the Command's intelligence capability was minimal due to the limited resources available. Assistant Commissioner Codd gave evidence that the Command reverted to the Crime and Intelligence Command for assistance with research and analytics, but this led to competition with other, non-domestic and family violence related, priorities. He was unsure how many times the Command had made requests for help.

By the time the Assistant Commissioner was recalled on 4 August 2022 he was able to provide the Commission with a copy of a research document entitled '1374 Domestic Violence – Other Action' obtained "*in recent weeks*", dated July 2022, as an example of the type of document the Command could obtain. He was otherwise unable to advise with any certainty how often the Command had asked for or obtained intelligence or research assistance from the Crime and Intelligence Command.

Given the strategic focus of the Command, the ability to generate intelligence assessments and to establish connections with other intelligence units within the QPS would enable a more proactive prevention and disruption focus for the QPS consistent with its approach to other crime types.

Assistant Commissioner Codd agreed the Command's capabilities could be enhanced through direct access to intelligence and research resources specifically focused on domestic and family violence.⁸⁸ It is not satisfactory that they currently do not have this capacity.

CASE STUDY

On 30 June 2021, an intelligence assessment was undertaken in respect of domestic and family violence in the Torres Strait and the Northern Peninsula Area.⁸⁹ A key finding of the assessment was that it was likely a domestic and family violence related death would occur within the area, given the frequency and severity of domestic violence towards aggrieved partners. The findings also raised concerns about a systemic problem with the inadequacy of policing responses to domestic and family violence in the Torres Strait area.

The assessment was disseminated at a local level, but not to the Command, despite the Command being on the dissemination list compiled by the intelligence officer. Someone other than him determined that it was not to be sent to the Command. In July 2021, the intelligence officer sent the assessment to two members of the Command. Though it was received by those two officers, the lack of a formal channel meant the assessment was not brought to the attention of the Command generally.⁹⁰ This is wholly unsatisfactory, especially given the key finding that a domestic and family violence death was likely.

The assessment was only brought to the attention of Assistant Commissioner Codd in August 2022 as a result of this Commission.⁹¹ It was not known who decided on the revised dissemination list and it was accepted by Assistant Commissioner Codd that it was “*terribly concerning*” the assessment had not been provided to the Command.⁹² He also accepted it would be beneficial if the Command had the capability to undertake and follow up on intelligence assessments of this nature.⁹³

At a public hearing on 4 August 2022, Assistant Commissioner Codd told the Commission he had been advised, by the Assistant Commissioner from Far Northern District (who had been told by a Superintendent), the following about the intelligence assessment:⁹⁴

- it was a training tool only
- the assessment was based on assumptions by the intelligence officer
- the author had little operational experience in attending and responding to domestic and family violence incidents
- the Officer in Charge of Thursday Island held a different view about several key findings.

The information provided to Assistant Commissioner Codd, and this Commission, was untrue.

In contrast to the advice provided to the Assistant Commissioner, the Commission later confirmed that the assessment was undertaken by a qualified intelligence analyst with 21 years of operational experience and had been peer reviewed by other QPS intelligence officers.⁹⁵ In addition, the intelligence officer had many years of experience policing domestic and family violence, including as recently as in 2022. His assessment was not based on any assumptions and on 6 October 2022, the Police Commissioner accepted that his assessment was “*well thought out and well documented.*”⁹⁶

EVALUATION OF RECENT INITIATIVES

As outlined above, the Command was responsible for the development of the QPS *Domestic and Family Violence Strategy 2021-2023*.⁹⁷ It then established a Domestic and Family Violence Action Plan, which was intended to provide a focused direction for the QPS and its domestic and family violence work, in line with its strategic priorities.⁹⁸ The Action Plan outlines 39 initiatives and, as at June 2022, 21 of those initiatives have been completed, with the other 18 in progress.⁹⁹

These initiatives have been nominated by senior members of the QPS as an important step in their response to domestic and family violence.¹⁰⁰ However, the deficiency in resources for the Command, as well as for the districts in their capability for responding to domestic and family violence, is apparent when considering the evaluations of recent initiatives, including the 2021 evaluation of Operation Tango Alessa which was designed to increase perpetrator accountability.

Operation Tango Alessa involved the development and pilot of a tool, adapted from the existing QPS Total Harm Ranking

& Evaluation Tool (THReT), to identify and rank offenders based on their known potential for committing significant harmful offences. The QPS THReT collates large volumes of known data across internal databases and presents the data for individual offenders into a usable intelligence and tactical risk mitigating ranking which can guide resourcing allocation.

Using that tool, high risk domestic and family violence offenders were identified, following which police within the trial districts were to employ deterrent strategies such as visiting the homes of the perpetrators to discuss referrals or contacting a person experiencing violence to check on their welfare and offer support.¹⁰¹

An evaluation of the Operation’s effectiveness in reducing domestic and family violence offending was released in December 2021.¹⁰² The reduction in charges against high risk offenders observed after the focused deterrence intervention in the Logan District provided some evidence that focused deterrence was effective in reducing domestic and family violence offending.¹⁰³ However, it was also noted

that there were several limitations to the Operation namely:

- its brevity
- the implementation and execution of the operation in each district heavily relied on the level of availability of staffing and resources
- there were competing operational requirements
- in some cases, the lack of resources limited the execution and operational engagement.

For example, in South Brisbane District, 20 high risk offenders were identified, but police were only able to visit the home of seven of those offenders. In all but one visit, the offender was either not home or not living at the address. Ultimately, only one of the high risk offenders identified was the subject of the operation.¹⁰⁴

While Operation Tango Alessa had the potential to contribute to the disruption of domestic and family violence, resourcing deficiencies and inconsistencies across the districts meant its true operational effect could not be accurately determined.

A further limitation identified was the use of the adapted THReT tool, which was not made specifically for identifying domestic and family violence offenders.¹⁰⁵ This tool had the unintended consequence of identifying people who did not have a current Protection Order in place as ‘high risk’.¹⁰⁶ While a Protection Order in and of itself is not a predictor of significant risk within a relationship characterised by domestic and family violence, this made engagement by the police with these offenders difficult. If the Command had sufficient resources, a domestic violence specific tool could be developed in order to target those most appropriately defined as high risk offenders.

Additionally, the evaluation of the Operation was completed by the Command in December 2021, though the Operation ended in May 2021. Further resources would allow for timely evaluation of such critical initiatives.

The Command is a positive initiative but must be properly resourced in order to assist in enhancing the QPS response to domestic and family violence. A recommendation to this effect is made at the end of this chapter.

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE ADVISORY GROUP

The Domestic and Family Violence Advisory Group (the Advisory Group) was established in July 2021 as an advisory body for issues relating to the prevention, disruption, response to and investigation of domestic and family violence.¹⁰⁷ The Advisory Group is comprised of advocates and experts from organisations in the domestic and family violence field.¹⁰⁸ Assistant Commissioner Codd explained that the purpose of the Advisory Group is to:

[a]ssist the Commissioner, the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command and the Service as a whole in making decisions in the domestic and family violence space that are effective and victim-centric.¹⁰⁹

The Advisory Group currently meets on a quarterly basis and while they are not a decision making body, the meetings provide a formal avenue for open collaboration between important domestic and family violence stakeholders and support services.¹¹⁰

Examples of some of the matters discussed at previous Advisory Group meetings include feedback given to the QPS on its *Domestic and Family Violence Strategy 2021-2023*¹¹¹ and insight by members into trauma-informed practice.¹¹²

The Commission heard from several domestic and family violence organisations who advocated for a more collaborative approach between the QPS and their organisations.¹¹³ Such submissions recognise the technical expertise that these organisations have and can share with the QPS on various topics, including trauma-informed and victim-centric practices and referral options.

An open dialogue with the QPS was also seen to benefit organisations who have ongoing contact with victim-survivors, as it allows for advocacy at both an individual and systemic level,¹¹⁴ and for information about police systems and practices to be more readily available to victim-survivors through the organisations.¹¹⁵

Within other jurisdictions, both Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory have an advisory group model in place to enhance their policing response to domestic and family violence. In Victoria, the Family Violence Reform Advisory Group is co-chaired by the Chief Executive Officer of Family Safety Victoria and Domestic Violence Victoria.¹¹⁶

The Advisory Group is a positive initiative, and its growth should be encouraged and supported. Accordingly, the Commission makes a recommendation to this effect at the end of this chapter.

CONCLUSION

In order to meet the challenge of a frontline which feels they have not been provided with adequate resources to respond effectively to the demand for domestic and family violence, the QPS must have a mechanism by which it can measure that demand so that it can meet it with appropriate resources.

This is an important strategic consideration that will be foundational to both improving the experience of the police who respond to domestic and family violence, and, in turn, improving the ability of the QPS to respond to domestic and family violence in a way that consistently meets community expectations.

More broadly, strategic direction and guidance in relation to the QPS response to domestic and family violence relies on the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command. The Command is currently hampered in its ability to be strategic and provide much needed guidance. It is important that Command resourcing be increased so that it can be forward-focused and provide the strategic direction necessary to meaningfully and continually improve QPS responses to domestic and family violence.

FINDINGS

- The Queensland Police Service does not have the ability to measure domestic and family violence demand and the effectiveness of its responses. Without the ability to measure this, the Queensland Police Service will be unable to accurately determine what further resources are necessary in order to consistently meet community expectations when it responds to domestic and family violence.
- The Queensland Police Service is not adequately resourced to meet the growing demand of responding to domestic and family violence, particularly in relation to numbers of frontline officers and specialist staff and units.
- The Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command has been under-resourced since its creation in February 2021. It continues to lack resources and, as a result, it is unable to provide the strategic direction necessary to improve Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence.
- The Domestic and Family Violence Advisory Group performs an important function in providing community and expert advice to the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command about matters related to the prevention, disruption, response to and investigation of domestic and family violence. Its role should be strengthened and there should be a mechanism by which the Executive Leadership Team is provided with timely information about the advice it provides to the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1

Within six months, the Queensland Police Service develop and implement a mechanism for measuring domestic and family violence demand and the effectiveness of police responses to domestic and family violence.

Recommendation 2

Within 12 months, the Queensland Police Service identify, using the mechanism for measuring domestic and family violence demand, the further additional funding and Full Time Equivalent positions needed to meet that demand.

Recommendation 3

Within 18 months, the Queensland Government allocate the funding and Full Time Equivalent positions identified by the Queensland Police Service as being required to meet the demand of responding to domestic and family violence.

Recommendation 4

Within six months, the Queensland Police Service strengthen the resource model of the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command to enhance its strategic capacity by:

- determining and allocating adequate funding to the Command
- transitioning all allocated positions to permanent positions
- building the Command's capacity and capability for undertaking research and intelligence activities
- building the Command's capacity and capability for undertaking advocacy and cultivating partnerships.

Recommendation 5

Within three months, the Queensland Police Service elevate the role of the Domestic and Family Violence Advisory Group by ensuring that:

- the Advisory Group is co-chaired by the Assistant Commissioner, Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command and one community organisation member
- the meeting agenda contains a standing agenda item for members to report any issues about police responses to domestic and family violence to the Command
- the Advisory Group makes recommendations about those issues for the Command to consider to enhance police responses to domestic and family violence
- the Command report on those issues and recommendations, and any actions taken by the Command, to the Executive Leadership Team after every meeting.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS

Domestic and family violence is a serious violation of human rights and police have an important role in responding to it. Measuring domestic and family violence demand, strengthening the capacity of the Command and elevating the role of the Advisory Group will lead to a greater capability by the QPS to prevent, disrupt and respond to domestic and family violence.

These measures will promote the personal rights of victim-survivors who are engaged when domestic and family violence is prevented and adequately responded to, including recognition and equality before the law as a result of better investigation (s 15 HRA), right to life (s 16 HRA), liberty and security (s 29 HRA), and protection for victim-survivors and their families (ss 17 and 26 HRA).

5 Specialist responses

While the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command (Command) was established in 2021 to strengthen the QPS strategic response to domestic and family violence, specialist responses to domestic and family violence have existed for some time.

This chapter considers the benefits and challenges of these roles in supporting officers to effectively respond to domestic and family violence.

SPECIALIST RESOURCES

Figure 17 identifies the various specialist resources which assist in the QPS response to domestic and family violence. These officers and teams exist at the district or regional level, with decisions about their resourcing and structure made at this level. The roles are intended to:

- coordinate the QPS response to domestic and family violence at a station, district and/or regional level
- improve the operational support provided to general duties officers
- provide quality assurance and oversight
- act as a point of liaison for external agencies and to help support local level initiatives.

While the Commission heard from multiple stakeholders that specialist officers within the QPS tended to have a better understanding of domestic and family violence, which resulted in improved responses overall,¹¹⁷ several issues were identified with these positions. They include that:

- there are significant differences in their scope and focus across the districts
- they are not consistently provided with training to fulfil their role
- their focus can default to quality assurance and compliance tasks
- they are often under-resourced and lack the capacity to provide operational specialist support to general duties officers.

Reports from QPS member submissions and surveys suggest that the roles are inadequately resourced, poorly promoted and do not have the capacity to effectively support general duties officers. Problems arise when the roles are filled by officers with no specialist training, no capacity to fulfill the additional requirements of the role, or no interest in the role. Differing capacity of specialist units across the state also contributes to dissatisfaction within the organisation.

Indeed, and despite the increased resourcing and focus on domestic and family violence responses in recent years in the QPS, results from the QPS DFV-Q 2022 survey conducted for the Commission showed that there was a general dissatisfaction among officers with the availability and accessibility of the support provided by specialist units to frontline officers.

Significantly, this sense of dissatisfaction had increased since an earlier QPS DFV-Q survey in 2018 such that:¹¹⁸

- 40.9% of survey participants in 2022 did not agree that specialist support was easily available (an increase of 12.3 points since 2018).
- 43.1% of survey participants in 2022 did not agree that Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators and Domestic Violence Liaison Officers provide guidance or influence their work (an increase from 26.8 points in 2018).

The 2022 results repeat membership criticism from the 2018 survey about organisational resourcing decisions with 61.1% of survey participants reporting the balance of resources was not working well.¹¹⁹ This deterioration in sentiment is evident across five of the seven regions.¹²⁰

This issue was commented on in numerous free-text responses to the survey, such as:

There needs to be more accountability of DVLOs, more support for DFVCs who are often pulled from different directions from district line managers and further, there needs to be more support for support agencies. Senior officers / Leaders need to identify when their staff are not managing and burnt out and there needs to be face to face learning opportunities for staff.

One or two DVLO's in an area isn't nearly enough. To make an example, have a look at the size of our traffic branch then consider that at the more serious end of the spectrum DV results in quite serious criminal offences being committed with victims and witnesses suffering a unique set of pressures. Why do we not have that many officers dedicated to dealing with a problem that takes up a far more significant percentage of time and can lead to extremely serious consequences?¹²¹

<p>DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE LIAISON OFFICERS (DVLOs)</p>	<p>DVLOs are responsible for undertaking quality assurance activities within stations to ensure compliance by general duties officers with relevant procedures and legislation.</p>
<p>DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE COORDINATORS (DFVCs)</p>	<p>DFVCs are responsible for coordinating and monitoring policing responses to domestic and family violence at a district level. This includes providing direction and advice to other officers, stakeholder liaison, assisting with training and undertaking quality assurance activities.</p>
<p>DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE AND VULNERABLE PERSONS UNITS (DFVVPUs)</p>	<p>DFVVPUs are responsible for actively engaging with victim-survivors and perpetrators at a district level, including identifying support options, and contributing to actions to improve perpetrator accountability.</p>
<p>HIGH RISK TEAM (HRT)</p>	<p>There are dedicated roles in the QPS to support the organisation's participation in HRTs in some areas in Queensland. A HRT is an interagency team which includes police, specialist services and other entities and is established to improve responses to victim-survivors at imminent risk of serious harm or lethality.</p>
<p>CO-LOCATION AND CO-RESPONDER MODELS</p>	<p>External agencies assist police to provide an optimal response. Co-location involves a social worker embedded in a police station or a specialist police member embedded in a non-government organisation. A co-response involves police attending a call for service with a specialist domestic and family violence worker.</p>

Figure 17: Summary of the critical district resources which, when implemented properly, improve police responses to domestic and family violence

Concerns about the limited organisational commitment given to the specialist resources were also evident in a number of responses, such as:

The DFV command need more staff and resources to do the job well.

DVLO's/VPU's are far removed from the every day responses to DV.

The VPU is creating more work for general duties, not relieving pressure or providing support. The VPU should be INVESTIGATING and ACTIONING DV matters, not initiating contact and then passing the work down to generals.¹²²

Submissions to the Commission recognised that there were officers who were passionate about this work and dedicated to their roles. However, they also noted that other police placed in the roles lacked the ability to effectively perform the tasks required. It was also evident that some police in specialist roles did not want to work in the role, which impacted their performance.¹²³

Ms Emma Wilson, a specialist domestic violence advocate embedded in the South Brisbane Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Unit, gave evidence that in her view, the professionalism, commitment and understanding of domestic and family violence issues displayed by officers who were permanently within the unit were of a high standard. She said:

They have a really clear passion and want to change and want to adapt as well with new - with everything rolling out and all the new policies and procedures that do come into place. They obviously have a vested interest in stopping the cycle and making sure that there are good long-term outcomes for women and children that have experienced domestic violence. Yes, I would say it's good.¹²⁴

Conversely, officers who are rotated into Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Units do not necessarily want to be in that role.¹²⁵ Some of these officers were disinterested and lacked the necessary passion to appropriately engage with domestic and family violence issues.¹²⁶ In this respect, Sergeant Neil Gardner, the DFVC at the South Brisbane DFVVPU, told the Commission:

Staffing the VPU with ill-suited staff can lead to frustration at, and inconsistency in, the VPU's response.¹²⁷

Temporary appointments and frequent staff turnover within Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Units are a significant issue.¹²⁸ Some general duties officers are also non-receptive to feedback from specialist officers and consider they are being monitored too heavily.¹²⁹

Each of the specialist roles are considered here in more detail.

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE LIAISON OFFICERS

Pursuant to section 9.15.4 of the QPS Operational Procedures Manual (OPM), the Officer in Charge (OIC) of a station is the domestic and family violence liaison officer (DVLO) for that station.¹³⁰ However, the role tends to get delegated to another officer in the station at Constable or Senior Constable level.

This position is intended to provide quality assurance of general duties officers' actions in responding to domestic and family violence.¹³¹ The DVLO role also provides guidance and advice for frontline officers, particularly in respect of compliance in creating domestic and family violence related occurrences within QPRIME.

While OICs are required to ensure that a DVLO has sufficient time and resources to fulfil these duties, in practice this does not always occur. They must often complete tasks alongside their other general duties, with no standard or specialist training (which includes competency testing) routinely provided.¹³² The Commission is aware that DVLO training has been conducted by QPS in the past.¹³³

On the lack of support for DVLOs, one QPS officer reflected in the QPS DFV-Q 2022 survey that:

When I agreed to take on the DVLO role I was shocked that there is no standardised training that all DVLO's undertake, and the haphazard approach to district running of this highly important government and QPS priority left me stunned.¹³⁴

Mr Mark Ainsworth, a retired Detective Superintendent, was engaged by the Commission to conduct interviews with police officers to assess the views of the QPS membership about various matters, including the capacity, capability and structures of the QPS to respond to domestic and family violence. A Constable who was interviewed by Mr Ainsworth stated that she was required to undertake the DVLO role in her station along with other general duties tasks. She reported that she had never been offered or received training on how to perform this role and found it very difficult to undertake her quality assurance activities in the required timeframe due to staffing levels, her other duties and no backfill arrangements while on leave.¹³⁵

Despite the OPM requiring that the position is appropriately resourced,¹³⁶ Chief Superintendent Ben Martain accepted at a hearing that DVLOs are under significant pressure because of the volume and complexity of the cases they review and the requirement that they fit these duties in after hours or while they are between other jobs.¹³⁷

Other officers who were interviewed by Mr Ainsworth provided views about the value of the DVLO role, which they reported was largely one that undertook 'checks and balances', rather than providing advice to other staff in the station. They also stated that there was no consistency in the position across districts, and that it would be beneficial if the role had a more operational focus.¹³⁸

Common feedback about DVLOs from other officers interviewed also included:

DVLO's mostly do audits of attending officers' paperwork re DV's and really do not value add to the DV investigation/support at all.¹³⁹

DVLO's are...only available when they are on roster. Not all DVLO's performing the role are trained and many don't want to work in the role but are rostered to do so.¹⁴⁰

DVLO role is a waste of time, basically just a checking process after more senior officers have completed the checks and balances.¹⁴¹

The Women's Legal Service Queensland submission echoed some of these concerns, including the absence of any requirement that holders of DVLO positions have training or expertise in identifying the domestic and family violence needs of a community.¹⁴²

The following case study provides a snapshot of the negative responses to domestic and family violence that can occur when officers in the DVLO role are not appropriately trained:

CASE STUDY: LAURA'S EXPERIENCE

Tim died by apparent suicide in 2018. At the time, he was separated from his wife of ten years, Laura. In the twelve months prior to his death, Tim's behaviour had deteriorated and had escalated in seriousness, including stalking and sexual assaults.

In the weeks prior to his death, Laura reported to police that Tim had threatened to shoot her and kill himself. This was confirmed by Tim to police. A week earlier, Laura reported to police that Tim was stalking and controlling her. She showed them a text message he had sent months earlier where he threatened to kill her and told them he had moved his firearms and she did not know where they were.

The day before his death, Laura attended the police station and spoke to Officer Beige who was undertaking the DVLO role and had been for two years. Laura reported the following to Officer Beige:

- Tim had made several previous threats to kill her and himself
- They had recently separated
- Laura had tried to get a formal Protection Order but the court was closed. There were no formal Protection Orders in place
- Laura had concerns for Tim's mental health, including that he was becoming extremely paranoid and obsessive, including calling her 30 times a day at some points
- Tim had access to firearms
- Two days prior, Tim had acted aggressively towards her and told her he hated her, in front of their children. He drove erratically from her house
- Tim had previously raped her.

The interaction between Officer Beige and Laura was captured on the officer's body worn camera. At the time, Laura was sobbing, shaking and clearly afraid. She pleaded with the officer to do something and said she thought Tim was going to kill her, or the children and himself to punish her.

While at times empathetic to Laura, Officer Beige advised her there was really nothing the police could do besides 'noting it on the system'. Officer Beige took no further action apart from advising her supervisor of the report and entering the interaction on the police system as a 'street check', meaning it was not flagged as a domestic violence occurrence.

This was plainly incorrect. At the least, Officer Beige could have completed an urgent application for a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) naming Laura and her children, with no contact conditions.

Following Tim's death, the QPS conducted an internal investigation and Officer Beige was interviewed about her interactions with Laura. Officer Beige stated that she would not have done anything differently if presented again with the same information Laura gave her and believed she had done all she could do. Officer Beige was advised of the clear risk factors present in the relationship but stated she 'respectfully disagreed.' Ultimately the investigation concluded that Officer Beige could not continue in the DVLO role without further training, including on recognising domestic and family violence risks, and that she be referred for disciplinary action for failing to investigate domestic and family violence.¹⁴³

Given the pressure on frontline officers responding to domestic and family violence, the DVLO role is critical in both supporting frontline police and providing quality assurance of the actions of such officers after the fact. It is an important specialist role to ensure the QPS response to domestic and family violence consistently meets community expectations.

In the Commission's view, DVLOs should be appropriately trained, and their function should be made clear. Importantly, DVLO positions should be established as permanent, full-time positions in order to provide an appropriate level of support to operational police and conduct the quality assurance aspect of the role. A recommendation to this effect is made at the end of this chapter.

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE COORDINATORS AND OFFICERS

Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators (DFVCs) are responsible for coordinating and monitoring the QPS response to domestic and family violence within their district.¹⁴⁴ While their specific activities may differ between districts, functions generally include:

- providing direction, guidance and advice to QPS members and the community
- community networking and liaison to develop referral networks and preventative strategies
- provision of advice and guidance to station DVLOs
- assisting with education and training
- liaising with other relevant units within the QPS
- identifying and monitoring repeat calls for service
- regular monitoring of QPRIME to ensure appropriate responses, and compliance with policy and legislation by officers.¹⁴⁵

Section 9.15.3 of the OPM requires that officers in charge of districts appoint DFVCs and allocate adequate time and resources to those officers to enable them to carry out their functions and duties. DFVC appointees must be at the rank of Sergeant.

Each district has at least one DFVC and there are a further six DFVCs located within the Brisbane Police Communication Centre.¹⁴⁶

Many previous reviews and reports have highlighted the critical importance of DFVCs in supporting an effective response to domestic and family violence. For example:

- In 2005 the Crime and Misconduct Commission¹⁴⁷ recommended a review of the role and function of the domestic violence coordinators. Significantly, the report found *“it is unlikely that such a role can be adequately undertaken on a part-time basis and to fulfil these responsibilities, the regional coordinator should preferably be a dedicated full-time position.”*¹⁴⁸
- At the 2014 inquest into the death of Noelene Marie Beutel,¹⁴⁹ the coroner noted the knowledge and dedication of the DFVC to policing domestic and family violence was impressive and found that if that officer was representative of the DFVCs throughout the state, then *“the service would do well to encourage and empower these officers.”*¹⁵⁰ As a result, the coroner recommended additional DFVC positions should be established in parts of Queensland where domestic violence is prevalent.¹⁵¹

- The Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland (2015) recommended increasing the staffing number of district DFVCs, in recognition of the valuable contribution they make to the experiences of victim-survivors of domestic and family violence.¹⁵²

Several districts also have Domestic and Family Violence Officers (DFVOs) who are appointed at the rank of Constable or Senior Constable and perform duties in support of the DFVC role.¹⁵³

There are no mandatory qualifications or role-specific criteria for appointment to these positions.¹⁵⁴ There are also no mandatory training requirements,¹⁵⁵ however some officers have received professional development in domestic and family violence. For example, in June 2021, a two day ‘Vulnerable Persons Conference’ was attended by over 130 QPS members working in domestic and family violence and vulnerable persons policing.¹⁵⁶

In addition, the Commission was told that specialist officers, including DFVCs and DFVOs, have been identified by the QPS for specialist training during the 2022-23 period, with the first course scheduled to be delivered in November 2022 and a further three courses to be delivered by June 2023.¹⁵⁷

While some district DFVCs, including those located in the Brisbane Police Communications Centre, work shifts, the role is predominantly staffed from 8am to 4pm.

There is also variability in the way that DFVCs manage compliance and monitoring functions across districts. Some conduct a review of all domestic and family violence occurrences within the previous 24 hours and assess what, if any, further action is required. In other districts, this function is shared with station DVLOs, DFVOs and other officers attached to Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Units (DFVVPUs). This monitoring process can involve tasking the initial general duties officer to provide further information, referring the occurrence to a High Risk Team or requiring further investigation of alleged criminal offences.¹⁵⁸

Sergeant Neil Gardner told the Commission at a hearing that the review of the previous day's domestic and family violence occurrences can take all day, leaving little time for him to fulfill other duties. He also reported that his decisions about whether further action is required are largely dependent on the information supplied by the general duties officers who have attended the occurrence.¹⁵⁹ On occasions, where the evidence is lacking, he will task other members of the DFVVPUs to find out more information.¹⁶⁰

This represents an ongoing risk for the QPS given the issues with inaccurate or under-reporting by some officers when they attend domestic and family violence related calls for service discussed in Part 1 of this Report.

Sergeant Gardner also reported that he found this role physically and emotionally exhausting and that it was not a sustainable way of working.¹⁶¹ He recognised his position and functions exposed him to the potential for burnout, compassion fatigue and vicarious trauma.¹⁶²

Another DFVC, Sergeant Elise Feltham, told the Commission that when she was initially appointed in Townsville in 2017, she did not have the capacity to review all occurrences on her own. While this was rectified with the appointment of further positions in early 2022, this was approximately five years after she first commenced in the role.¹⁶³

Some officers in DFVC roles told Mr Ainsworth they felt undervalued. One Sergeant said that, in her role as DFVC, she “feels very much undervalued by other police including some senior management and first response officers...[and] does not get the credit for the experience she possesses by other police within the district.”¹⁶⁴

Frontline police also often do not understand the role of DFVCs, and the role does not appear to be well promoted internally.¹⁶⁵ The Sergeant referred to above also told Mr Ainsworth that she has “seen failings by OIC’s in the induction phase of new FYC’s (first year constables) by failing to introduce them to her role as the DFVC. This failure does not allow the officers to know who she is and what she does and how she can assist.”¹⁶⁶

In the Commission’s view, the roles of DFVCs and DFVOs are important for improving QPS responses to domestic and family violence. When they operate effectively, the roles have the potential to significantly bolster the quality of the QPS response. However, they are used inconsistently and there is inadequate information provided to the QPS membership about the support that these positions can provide.

In the Commission’s view, the function of DFVCs and DFVOs should be consistent across the organisation, and the function of the role should be made clear. A recommendation to this effect is made at the end of this chapter.

DFVCs IN BRISBANE POLICE COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE

Since March 2021, there have been six DFVCs working in the Brisbane Police Communications Centre. These appointments were made to improve the advice and assistance available to general duties officers after hours. They offer support almost 24 hours a day, seven days a week, however the demand on these six officers is intense.¹⁶⁷

They are required to assist frontline officers attending domestic and family violence related calls for service with decisions and investigations, when requested. They also monitor police calls for service to look for domestic and family violence related issues where they consider they can provide useful information to the frontline officer who is attending the scene.¹⁶⁸

These positions were filled by an internal expression of interest. No minimum qualifications or mandatory criteria were required to fulfil the role although previous experience as a DVLO or DFVC was preferred. Not all officers currently have this previous experience.¹⁶⁹

There was no mandatory training provided to the DFVCs in the Brisbane Police Communications Centre, despite Chief Superintendent Martain’s evidence that the QPS would prefer them to have completed a domestic and family violence specialist course.¹⁷⁰

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE AND VULNERABLE PERSON UNITS

Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Units (DFVVPUs) have been established in some QPS districts to enhance policing responses to domestic and family violence and other vulnerable persons. Their responsibilities include:

- actively engaging with victim-survivors and perpetrators within their district
- identifying support options for victim-survivors and perpetrators
- supporting investigations of potential criminal offences
- assisting in perpetrator accountability.¹⁷¹

Officers in DFVVPUs are not first responders. The roles are focused on taking follow-up action to reduce future domestic and family violence related calls for service. They also fulfill a secondary compliance and quality assurance role.¹⁷²

DFVVPUs exist in ten of the 15 police districts in Queensland, with a commitment made by the QPS to expand them into the remaining districts by December 2023.¹⁷³ This expansion is being supported by the Command through the QPS DFVVPUs capability framework and associated maturity assessment tool.¹⁷⁴

The maturity assessment tool is intended to support each district to have improved visibility of its allocation of resources for domestic and family violence, within the context of local service delivery demands and community needs.¹⁷⁵ The broader DFVVPUs capability framework has established a benchmark of the key principles, functions, resourcing allocations, and operation of these units within districts.¹⁷⁶

At this stage, the rollout of DFVVPUs across districts is ongoing, and some are more mature and established than others. For example, those located in the Gold Coast and Logan districts have greater resourcing and are more advanced in their operations compared to other districts.¹⁷⁷

The size and structure of each DFVVPUs varies depending on district needs and priorities. They are also resourced through growth allocations¹⁷⁸ which means that they are competing for positions against other district priorities.

Not all roles in a DFVVPUs are filled with officers on a permanent or long-term basis. Some rotate through the role every three to six months which is disruptive, and results in a loss of knowledge and skills within the DFVVPUs and a continued need to train new staff.¹⁷⁹

The rotation of staff, particularly those without any specialist training, can lead to poor responses to domestic and family violence.¹⁸⁰ As reported by the Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Women’s Legal Services North Queensland:

Police working in specialised DFV units are not immune from the issues with police attitudes and culture that are endemic to the rest of the police service. QPS staff assigned to specialised response units report many of the same attitudes to sufferers of non-physical violence, long-term abuse, and coercive control as their less experienced counterparts. Therefore, it is clear that the creation of these specialised units is not a panacea.¹⁸¹

In some districts, officers feeling burnt out by their substantive role or who need a break from shift work are rotated into the DFVVPU. In some cases, they have no desire to work in a specialist domestic and family violence unit and are not committed to achieving its objectives.¹⁸²

Such an approach impacts the effectiveness and credibility of a DFVVPU and reflects a lack of prioritisation of the unit's work. For example, a former DFVVPU staff member reported that:

Officers who work in the VPU...stated that their career pathway was affected as they chose to work in DV which the service did not highly regard... Local stations would also send "problem officers" to VPU to work where they become an even bigger problem and working in the unit was not the appropriate place for them.¹⁸³

Some feedback from officers who participated in the QPS DFV-Q 2022 survey did however highlight the value of officers rotating through the DFVVPU:

I work in the VPU and believe it has been very beneficial for first year constables to do a two week rotation in our office. I believe they are left with a favourable impression of the VPU which is not often the case with officers who have not had contact with the VPU except for being sent a task to fix up something.¹⁸⁴

While there are benefits to having officers rotating through a DFVVPU to enhance their knowledge and skills in responding to domestic and family violence, this approach only works where the unit is staffed by well trained and permanent members who can provide guidance and support to new officers.

Similar to DVLOs, DFVOs and DFVCs, there are currently no essential criteria and no ongoing training requirements for working in a DFVVPU.¹⁸⁵

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE

While there is considerable value in appropriately resourced specialist units within the districts to assist other officers to better understand and respond to domestic and family violence, concerns have been raised about the current structure and resourcing of the DFVVPU.

The DFVVPU do not operate on a 24/7 basis and their lack of availability outside business hours is a point of dissatisfaction for frontline officers.¹⁸⁶ Results from the QPS DFV-Q 2022 survey highlighted concerns with the current staffing of 8am to 4pm shifts.¹⁸⁷ Survey participants reported that:

[VPUs] needs more resources 24/7. I don't know how many times I have been in a crew where we've called the local VPU and not been able to get an answer on any phone number.¹⁸⁸

The VPU needs to be increased in numbers and needs to commence working 24/7 and responding to DV incidents.¹⁸⁹

Understandably, officers feel frustrated that they do not have access to the specialist guidance they require to inform their decisions, and then are followed up by the DFVVPU the next day because they have missed something. This erodes the little spare time they have on a shift in circumstances where they may have been able to address the issue if DFVVPU staff had been available when they needed assistance.

A well-resourced DFVVPU that operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week would also be able to take the burden of 'on call' advice from other officers on duty, and lead to timelier, better informed responses to victim-survivors. Due to variability in population across districts each DFVVPU need not operate at full 24 hour, seven day capacity, as long as officers from the DFVVPU are available on-call to assist frontline officers with enquiries.

ASPECTS OF DFVVPU THAT WORK WELL

A well-resourced and high functioning DFVVPU is widely acknowledged as a positive initiative in the QPS response to domestic and family violence. Such recognition was clear in the evidence received by the Commission from a range of sources, including victim-survivors, community organisations and QPS members.

For example, the Commission heard from Ms Rosemary O'Malley, Chief Executive Officer of Gold Coast Domestic Violence Prevention Centre (DVPC), who noted that:

...while women report...their poor experiences when reporting DV at police stations, they frequently report exceptional responses and outcomes when the DFV Specialist Units/VPUs become involved. DVPC could not do our daily work without the assistance of officers in the Gold Coast DFV/VPU.¹⁹⁰

The Commission also heard from Sergeant Michael Read, a police prosecutor, who noted that:

The VPU in Logan is in the next room to the prosecutions office and this close relationship worked very well in managing high risk respondents and aggrieved persons in need of further and better access to support.¹⁹¹

Other examples of positive submissions from community organisations about DFVVPUs include:

The co-location of a DFV Specialist Social Worker from BDVS in a Vulnerable Persons Unit has had a positive impact on the understanding of DFV and coercive control for those police officers on rotation. In working alongside each other, BDVS staff and police build good relationships, share information and knowledge routinely, and promote understanding with a wider group of police officers when on a new rotation. This helps to open-up a police culture to new influences. We also better understand the police role and perspectives through this co-location.¹⁹²

The individual officers working in the VPU currently display dedication and passion for the work they undertake, and the commitment they make to positive and purposeful relationships with sector colleagues.¹⁹³

The use of District based DFV&VPU's who case manage high and extreme risk DV respondents and aggrieved persons [works well]. These units are essential when trying to prevent and disrupt DV.¹⁹⁴

VPU's work well as they have formed complex multi agency relationships that are genuinely beneficial to the QPS and victims.¹⁹⁵

Professor Silke Meyer, School of Health Sciences and Social Work, Griffith Criminology Institute and Griffith Centre for Mental Health, Griffith University, conducted research in 2021 which demonstrated that specialist domestic and family violence officers in DFVVPUs have clear understanding of the complexities associated with such violence. She noted that these findings highlight the benefits of the DFVVPUs as they tend to provide more domestic and family violence informed and holistic responses to both victim-survivors and perpetrators.¹⁹⁶

Recent research into opportunities to address the misidentification of victim-survivors as perpetrators also highlighted positive experiences with this specialist approach. The 2020 Australian National Research Organisation for Women's Safety report, *Accurately identifying the 'person most in need of protection' in domestic and family violence law* noted the following observations:

But it's not 'til you ask to speak with a [VPU] officer, it's a completely different attitude, completely different ... [VPU] are probably by far the best - (a victim-survivor).¹⁹⁷

They've [VPU] done some great training, so quite often, I can advocate that way and they will really dig deep and engage in a respectful, gentle way and they'll really think about which officer they're going to allocate - (a domestic violence service provider).¹⁹⁸

The other thing we will do is we'll contact VPU directly and say, "Smith has been identified as a respondent. A female respondent. However, we feel that that may not be the correct course of action that we've taken." And then VPU may take up further enquiries as we go from there - (a police prosecutor).¹⁹⁹

Positive feedback was also received from victim-survivors where frontline officers and representatives from the DFVVPUs proactively worked together to provide support throughout relevant court proceedings.

CONFIDENTIAL SUBMISSION RECEIVED FROM A VICTIM-SURVIVOR

I would like to make a submission in support of the Maryborough police officers that I dealt with this year in relation to domestic violence complaint I made. The reporting officer (redacted) who I spoke to the first late afternoon was very helpful, understanding and supportive making sure I was safe and understood what was going to happen next. Each time I spoke with (redacted) he helped me to understand what was happening.

Where I had to appear in court less than two days after the Vulnerable Persons Unit officers (redacted), the Police Prosecutor and the DV Connect were very supportive. The VPU and prosecutions both fought to maintain the Protection Order when the solicitor continually tried to reduce the order by putting in multiple submissions.

I understand that many victim/survivors of domestic violence may not have been supported in the same way, but I wanted you to know my story. Even though I had not been 'hit' and my situation may not have been 'typical,' the officers involved recognised the emotional abuse, psychological abuse, stalking behaviour and control that was occurring.

I am now able to live my life with my children without constant worry about what will happen next or how many times my phone will ring and beep in the next hour. Thank you to (redacted) for everything they have done for me this year.

The specialist focus of DFVVPUs also mean they have more capacity to oversee district responses and implement case management strategies to better respond to local demand pressures. While increased oversight of domestic and family violence related occurrences may help to improve consistency in approaches taken by individual officers, the monitoring role of DFVVPUs has not been without criticism.

Mr Ian Leavers, President of the Queensland Police Union of Employees, submitted to the Commission that there is workplace division between operational officers and specialist units such as the DFVVPU, which are seen to operate as *“another layer of oversight and criticism by those working the comfort of a day shift and not having to deal with stress and difficulties associated with attending the scene.”*²⁰⁰ Conversely, Mr Leavers also highlighted that other work undertaken by DFVVPU staff is not seen or valued by frontline officers where interactions are generally focused on compliance.²⁰¹

Issues identified about the operation of the DFVVPU in submissions largely related to a lack of understanding or interaction between these officers and general duties police.²⁰²

OTHER APPROACHES IN AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES

The New South Wales Police Force does not have dedicated Domestic Violence units. Instead, specialist police are distributed across 57 local area commands and include:²⁰³

Domestic Violence Officers who provide support in local commands by linking with community stakeholders, collecting information and intelligence, conducting compliance checks to ensure that police comply with standard operating procedures, and providing support and follow-up for victim-survivors.

Domestic Violence Operatives who are tasked with proactively identifying, targeting and monitoring repeat offenders of domestic and family violence crime. Their role is to reduce re-offending, coordinate bail and apprehended domestic violence orders, conduct compliance operations, and assist Domestic Violence Officers. Operatives also operationalise the DV Suspect Targeting Management Plan (DV-STMP), by surveilling high risk offenders and monitoring compliance with domestic violence orders.

In 2016, the New South Wales Police Force also introduced six Domestic Violence High Risk Offender Teams tasked with taking a proactive approach to identifying, targeting, and monitoring repeat offenders of domestic and family violence.²⁰⁴

VICTORIA

Victoria Police’s Family Violence Investigative Units investigate serious, complex or high risk cases.²⁰⁵ Situated in each police division, Family Violence Investigative Units are led by a detective senior sergeant, and include a team of investigators, an intelligence analyst, a Family Violence Training Officer and a Family Violence Court Liaison Officer.

The Court Liaison Officer is a key contact point between the prosecutor, witnesses, legal representatives, victims, and court staff. They assist the court process and ensure the victim-survivor is fully informed of civil and criminal proceedings. All 24-hour police stations in Victoria also have a Family Violence Liaison Officer. This officer is a supervisor, and their role includes quality assurance of the station’s domestic and family violence response, reviewing risk assessments, coordinating further responses, and acting as the station’s contact point for Family Violence Investigative Units and external agencies.²⁰⁶

TASMANIA

Each of Tasmania’s three police districts have a dedicated Family Violence Unit,²⁰⁷ responsible for assessing and monitoring all family violence matters in their area, with a particular focus on perpetrator accountability. Police within a Family Violence Unit are not primary responders for family violence.²⁰⁸

Expanded operating hours would improve the support provided by DFVVPUs to general duties officers. The Commission also received evidence that indicated that improvements in policing responses can be achieved when a DFVVPU is well-resourced with suitably qualified, permanent officers who have an interest in responding to domestic and family violence.

In support of this, Act for Kids submitted that to achieve a change in culture and approach in policing domestic and family violence, DFVVPUs need permanent, trained and dedicated staff, and that consideration should be given to implementing a vetting process to ensure that officers are knowledgeable and hold appropriate attitudes and beliefs prior to their appointment to the role.

A strong connection and partnerships between district DFVVPUs, general duties officers, tactical crime squads, and other specialist units (such as the Child Protection Investigation Unit and Criminal Investigation Branch) is also critical.

This approach recognises the importance of all police working together to respond to domestic and family violence, and the need to draw on all areas of specialisation within the QPS to effectively respond.

Ideally, a well-resourced DFVVPU should include a mix of officers with specialist experience in domestic and family violence, as well as those with investigative, intelligence and prosecution expertise, combined with non-QPS employees from specialist support services.

The following diagram depicts the mix of skills and positions that should be part of a DFVVPU:




Figure 18: Skills and roles required for the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Unit as outlined within the Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Capability Framework²⁰⁹

DFVVPUs should be staffed with permanently appointed and properly trained officers who are dedicated and interested in best practice responses to domestic and family violence. They should also have a capability to better investigate domestic and family violence matters. The Commission makes recommendations to improve DFVVPUs at the end of this chapter.

HIGH RISK TEAMS

Established in Queensland as part of the reforms following the report of the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence (2015), High Risk Teams (HRTs) are a core component of a broader integrated service response to domestic and family violence.

They currently operate in eight areas across Queensland²¹⁰ and were established to support a coordinated, multi-agency response to victims-survivors and their children who are at high risk of serious harm or death.²¹¹ The teams are the responsibility of the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, and include representatives from specialist services, police, health, corrective services, child safety, housing, and youth justice.

All HRTs include a civilian representative from the QPS.²¹² The QPS members of the HRT sit within the local DFVPU, where one is operating, and are overseen by the DFVPU's Officer in Charge.²¹³

The establishment of HRTs, supported by a Common Risk and Safety Framework and cross-agency system, allows for timely, consistent, and streamlined sharing of information by different representatives for persons referred to the teams who are considered to be at imminent risk of serious harm or lethality.²¹⁴

Once a referral is accepted, the HRT considers the information held by each agency, within the context of a comprehensive risk assessment and safety management tool,²¹⁵ and develops a case management plan with agreed actions for each agency to undertake.²¹⁶ This approach means that the HRT has a more comprehensive understanding of the case than any of the agencies, acting alone, may possess.

This means the HRT can better understand and document the pattern of abuse within the relevant relationship, consider key risk indicators and shift the focus of agencies away from specific incidents.²¹⁷ This is particularly useful for police, who respond at crisis points with limited information or time, and it can also help to prevent the misidentification of victim-survivors as perpetrators.

While this model has its benefits for the QPS, including helping to improve a cross-agency response to high-risk cases, opportunities for improvement have been identified.

The Commission was told it can be challenging to refer cases to HRTs due to a clunky and difficult process.²¹⁸ Consequently many victim-survivors who should be referred to a team are not.²¹⁹ The Women's Legal Service Queensland also highlighted that the teams do not manage cases long-term or beyond a point of crisis.

It also became apparent that at least some officers within the QPS do not understand the purpose or operation of HRTs and, in some cases and more concerningly, awareness of the existence of HRTs at all. An officer who spoke to Mr Ainsworth said:

...the concept of HRT is great but is not marketed properly to frontline officers ... most frontline officers are not aware of the existence of the HRT and what they do.²²⁰

The Department of Justice and Attorney-General is continuing to progress improvements to HRTs following a 2019 evaluation which highlighted the need for the teams, and the broader integrated service response, to have a stronger focus on perpetrator accountability, develop more culturally appropriate responses and better define agency roles and responsibilities.²²¹

This evaluation also found that while the Common Risk and Safety Framework was designed for use by all participating agencies as part of an integrated service response, it had developed differently than intended.²²² It highlighted that agencies, including the QPS, were continuing to use their own tools to assess risk, with the relevant HRT representative completing the Common Risk and Safety Framework only when making a referral into the team. This negates the intent of the tool which aims to develop a shared understanding, language and common approach to recognising, assessing and responding to domestic and family violence.²²³

The QPS does not use the Common Risk and Safety Framework outside of the HRT, and instead relies on the DV-PAF to help guide officers' decision making when responding to domestic and family violence related calls for service. There are 22 identified risk factors police can use to inform themselves of the protective needs of a victim-survivor and to support their decision-making.²²⁴

A recent evaluation of the DV-PAF found that while it is quick and easy to use, it is unable to predict recidivism and *"as a consequence it cannot be recommended as a risk assessment tool."*²²⁵ Instead, it was useful for identifying the characteristics of a perpetrator, and as an aid to guide investigations. Similarly, the use of the DV-PAF is inconsistent even when taught at the Academy, with some officers trained to methodically go through each of the risk factors while others are trained to use it as a guide to assess a situation.²²⁶

The Department of Justice and Attorney-General recently released an updated Common Risk and Safety Framework in response to that evaluation and previous recommendations and findings of the Domestic and Family Violence Death Review and Advisory Board. Given the importance of the QPS being able to work more effectively across agencies, there would be benefit in it fully adopting this framework for use outside of HRTs, to help support better understanding of, and communication about, risk and safety. The Commission makes a recommendation to this effect at the end of this chapter.

OTHER INTERAGENCY TEAMS

HRTs are not the only model in Queensland designed to improve agencies' responses to high risk or complex domestic and family violence cases. Multi-agency teams have also been established locally in some police districts to improve information sharing, collaboration, and case management. These initiatives are generally led by local specialist services and include a mix of different agencies (including police). Examples of different models include:

- Domestic Violence Cross Agency Monitoring (DVCAM), coordinated by Centacare (located on the Sunshine Coast)
- Multi-Agency Triage and Case Lead Allocation (MATCLA), coordinated by the Integrated Family and Youth Service (IFYS) (located on the Sunshine Coast)
- Gold Coast Domestic Violence Integrated Response (Dvir), coordinated by the Gold Coast Domestic Violence Protection Centre (DVPC).

These teams are intended to enhance responses to people experiencing domestic and family violence through improved information sharing, case collaboration and management, and better coordination of services.

Submissions from community organisations identified a range of positive benefits of these initiatives, including the development of stronger relationships between police and community services, improved information sharing and decision making, and better safety planning.²²⁷ Professor Heather Douglas, from the Melbourne Law School at the University of Melbourne, told the Commission there is an increasing evidence base that supports a multi-disciplinary approach, noting that "*QPS officers are historically supportive of this approach.*"²²⁸

A multi-disciplinary response can also assist police to better understand the nuanced tactics a perpetrator may use to exert control over their partner or family member and improve responses to repeat calls for service.²²⁹

OTHER APPROACHES IN AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA

The *Family Violence Multi-Agency Risk Assessment and Management Framework* is a legislated service delivery framework which aligns the understanding of family violence, responsibilities, and information sharing between agencies.²³⁰ Information sharing is also legislated, with prescribed entities who can share and request information relevant to domestic and family violence matters.

NEW SOUTH WALES

The *Domestic Violence Safety Assessment Tool (DVSAT)* automatically communicates risk assessments to a central referral point, allowing constant monitoring of cases by external agencies, including repeat calls for service.²³¹

SOUTH AUSTRALIA, TASMANIA AND NORTHERN TERRITORY

Each of these jurisdictions align the responsibilities of various agencies and provide legislated information sharing between them to provide a coordinated and structured response to domestic and family violence. When cases are referred into the models, multi-agency meetings develop coordinated responses by each of the participating agencies.

- South Australia implemented the *Family Safety Framework* in 2013.²³²
- Tasmania established the *Safe Families Coordination Unit* in 2016.²³³
- Northern Territory implemented the *Domestic and Family Violence Risk Assessment and Management Framework* in 2018.²³⁴

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

In 2013, Western Australia established the Family and Domestic Violence Response Team, a partnership between the Department of Communities (Child Protection and Family Support), Western Australia Police and non-government family and domestic violence services.²³⁵ The Family and Domestic Violence Response Team organises case management meetings between relevant agencies to share information and develop safety plans for high risk cases.

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

The Family Violence Intervention program commenced in 1998 and is chaired by the Victims of Crime Commissioner.²³⁶ The program has two functions:

- a coordinating committee that identifies and implements reforms across agencies in the ACT
- a case tracking program which involves a weekly interagency meeting to provide coordinated responses to family violence matters that come to the attention of police and proceed to prosecution.

CO-RESPONDER AND CO-LOCATION MODELS

Domestic and family violence is a complex issue that requires a targeted and specialised police response best delivered in partnership with other agencies. Significant benefits can be gained when police and specialist services are located together or respond jointly to a domestic and family violence related occurrence. QPS submissions note that it is very much in favour of co-responder models and has advocated for a co-responder model since 2020.

The Commission heard many victim-survivors had positive engagements with police in specialist and co-located models. Reported feedback included:

The police took my case seriously, they listened to me and have respected me the whole way through. I feel really listened to by them.

The two female officers handling this matter have gone above and beyond to assist.

Very supportive, understanding and willing to help.²³⁷

Additionally, the Commission heard from specialist services working with police in co-located or co-responder models, leading to positive outcomes for victim-survivors. While those same groups shared stories of victim-survivors' negative experiences with police outside co-located or co-responder models, feedback about their experiences when working with police in a co-located and co-responder model highlighted a range of positive outcomes.

These outcomes included significantly enhanced well-being, stability and safety for victim-survivors and their children, increased proactiveness, follow-up and information sharing by police,²³⁸ enhanced cross-agency collaboration and shared learnings between the QPS and specialist services and reduced workload for the QPS.²³⁹

Ms Karyn Walsh, Chief Executive Officer of Micah Projects, agreed that *“co-response work is an excellent way of breaking down the power imbalance between police and victims, and can lead to improving how all stakeholders engage through a trauma informed lens.”*²⁴⁰

Police who responded to the QPS DFV-Q 2022 survey also acknowledged the importance of engaging with other agencies. One respondent said:

Other government agencies really need to move to a 24/7 model and undertake the roles and responsibilities needed to support both aggrieved and respondent persons. Police are trying to do all of these roles and are overwhelmed, burning out and desperate for change. They are so swamped with DFV related jobs we are failing people unintentionally.

More assistance from support agencies to assist in managing aggrieveds, particularly when they become hostile and unwilling to cooperate with Police. This does not mean exerting any sort of pressure to cooperate but rather provide more concentrated ongoing support in relation to recognising their status as an aggrieved and utilising support services to exit relationships that perpetuate domestic violence and victimisation.²⁴¹

It is evident that such approaches help to address several issues in current responses by police to domestic and family violence.

In her report, Professor Silke Meyer said that police responses have improved somewhat following recent reforms, but further benefits could be gained from co-location of a domestic and family violence specialist worker in police stations, as well as police partnering with specialist workers to co-respond to domestic and family violence calls for service. Professor Meyer also noted that co-responder models can be particularly beneficial in First Nations communities where victim-survivors and alleged perpetrators may be reluctant to engage with police due to institutional racism and previous poor police responses.²⁴²

CO-RESPONDER TRIALS

One significant barrier for police to effectively respond to domestic and family violence is the reluctance of the parties involved to provide officers with an accurate account of what has occurred.

As discussed elsewhere in this Report, there are many individual, cultural and historical barriers that impact a victim-survivor's willingness to engage with the police.²⁴³ While there are opportunities to address some of these barriers to encourage open disclosure to police, it is also important to recognise that some victim-survivors may prefer to disclose their experiences to professionals other than police, such as social workers.

Co-responder models involve police attending a domestic and family violence related call for service with a specialist service provider. Ms Emma Wilson, a BDVS domestic violence advocate embedded at a DFVPU in Brisbane, explained:

It allows the embedded worker to interact with aggrieveds at a critical opportunity to share information, safety plan and receive practical needs like a safe phone. This assists in building rapport with the embedded worker and with QPS, supporting future responses.²⁴⁴

While a substantial proportion of a general duties police officers' time is spent attending domestic and family violence related calls for service, they are often focused on ensuring the immediate safety of the parties involved and identifying whether any criminal offences have occurred.

Given the investigative nature of their role, the police role is largely limited to providing advice, making referrals, gathering evidence, applying for a Protection Order and/or pursuing criminal charges.

On the other hand, representatives from specialist services have a different skill set and perspective, and are better equipped to assess risk, develop a safety plan and identify any support needs. Victim-survivors may also be more comfortable discussing the options available to them with a specialist worker than with police.²⁴⁵

Practically, the specialist worker can also assist police in gathering evidence, improving perpetrator accountability, as well as reducing the risk of misidentification of the person most in need of protection.²⁴⁶ They are also better able to follow up with the relevant parties after the immediate crisis has resolved, which can further assist police through more intensive management of high risk cases or repeat calls for service.²⁴⁷

Providing a co-response is, however, not without its challenges as such responses can be resource intensive, and there are competing views from specialist services about the most appropriate model. While there have been several recent trials in Queensland with some indications of success, funding has not been extended after the trial period in those cases.²⁴⁸

For example, and as discussed in more detail below, the successful trial of a co-responder arrangement in Logan involving The Centre for Women & Co. and the QPS ceased in December 2021 after the allocated funding expired. In April 2022, the Centre for Women and Co. was able to secure funding support from the Small Steps 4 Hannah foundation for a three month period and the trial resumed.²⁴⁹ Unstable and short-term funding is a clear impediment to the effective operation of a co-response model, particularly as it disrupts interagency partnerships and continuity in service delivery. Another barrier is that many specialist services do not operate outside of business hours.²⁵⁰ A submission from Micah Projects explained:

The challenge is capacity. There is just one team of two workers servicing metropolitan Brisbane. Access to this opportunity, while leading to better outcomes for women and children, is limited to such a small number of victims/survivors. Co-responder work when done well ensures greater safety planning with victims, and greater understanding of the patterns of abuse, control and behaviour of the perpetrator. The dual approach achieves better outcomes.²⁵¹

Attending a domestic and family violence related call for service is potentially dangerous. Additionally, there is limited availability of suitably qualified and experienced specialist support workers. The Commission was advised by Ms Rosemary O'Malley, Chief Executive Officer of the Gold Coast Domestic Violence Protection Centre, that it would be difficult to resource a 24-hour co-response project, as staff numbers are limited, and it takes both time and training to develop the skills required to be an effective advocate.²⁵²

Police are trained and prepared to deal with this type of situation and have powers to keep themselves, and the parties who are involved, safe. However, there are risks involved for specialist support workers who attend a domestic and family violence related call for service at a point of crisis.²⁵³

For this reason, a co-responder model which sees police attend a domestic and family violence related occurrence, and establish that it is safe, before inviting a co-responder worker to attend, is the preferred approach.

EXAMPLE MODELS

The Partnership Response at Domestic Occurrences (P.R.A.D.O.) is an example of a successful, well-established co-responder model. It commenced in 2011, with specialist caseworkers co-located in the Caboolture police station, and has now expanded to include Redcliffe, Pine Rivers, Burpengary, and North Lakes police stations.

Caseworkers are embedded (co-located) at police stations and assist Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators within the QPS. They also receive referrals from police, and a crisis response is provided to the victim-survivor as soon as possible (usually within 24 to 48 hours). Case management and safety planning is also offered. P.R.A.D.O. caseworkers are also members of the Domestic Violence Cross Agency Monitoring (DVCAM), a High Risk Team type model coordinated by Centacare (referenced above in the HRT section), as well as the Moreton Bay HRT.

P.R.A.D.O. caseworkers receive direct referrals from the QPS and are able to discuss them with the Domestic and Family Violence Coordinator which expedites the crisis response. Previously, P.R.A.D.O. caseworkers accompanied police on home visits, however, this has stopped due to safety risks. Instead, caseworkers contact victim-survivors via telephone and if they are unable to make contact, request that the QPS undertakes a welfare check.²⁵⁴

P.R.A.D.O. was evaluated in 2021 and was found to have many features which improved the response to domestic and family violence.²⁵⁵ Positive impacts included collaboration with police, links with DVCAM and the HRT, co-location with police and the influence of trauma-informed understanding on police responses.

The Safer Lives Mobile Service is another model which is operated by the Brisbane Domestic Violence Service (Micah Projects) and works in partnership with DV Connect.²⁵⁶ This is a co-response service which operates after hours to assist women and children to explore their safety options.²⁵⁷

In practice, a social worker attends in partnership with police to support the victim-survivor while police deal with the immediate threat of an alleged perpetrator. In the 2021/22 financial year, 517 people were provided a co-response through this model.²⁵⁸

This 24-hour mobile service gives police the opportunity to contact the service and co-respond when it is safe to do so. Information sharing, risk assessment and decision making is improved by the presence of a specialised social worker.²⁵⁹

Some of the tasks police would otherwise undertake can be completed by the service organisation, such as referrals to agencies, alleviating workload for officers. This type of collaborative partnership can also help police develop their understanding of domestic and family violence and address police biases and attitudes.

In her findings related to the deaths of Hannah Clarke and her children, Aaliyah Baxter, Laianah Baxter and Trey Baxter, Deputy State Coroner Jane Bentley recommended a trial of a multi-disciplinary specialist domestic violence police station.²⁶⁰ This would involve the co-location of specialist domestic and family violence police officer and a support worker, a lawyer and employees from the Department of Housing, the Department of Child Safety and Queensland Health. It was recommended that the trial occur in Logan or Kirwan, due to the high rates of domestic and family violence calls for service in these areas.

There are a range of anticipated benefits with this approach, given the broad collaboration that could occur in this type of facility. However, the extensive resources required for this specific multi-disciplinary approach mean that it would not be possible for every police station to be similarly staffed and therefore other models must also be examined.

The Centre for Women & Co. also recently trialled a co-responder pilot with the QPS in Logan. In its submission, The Centre for Women & Co. said, “from day one we have experienced positive outcomes for women”²⁶¹ and that there were learnings gained by both agencies, with a positive shift in police culture. Police involved with the pilot also noted its benefits, including “a clear improvement in the skills and knowledge of the police officers assigned to the Co-Responder model.”²⁶²

2021 LOGAN CO-RESPONSE PILOT

The Centre for Women & Co. commenced a co-responder model with the Logan Central Police Station’s Domestic Violence Engagement Team. The trial ran between September and December 2021 and dealt with over 300 cases. The Centre for Women & Co. provided one domestic and family violence specialist who was based in the Logan Central police station alongside the Domestic Violence Engagement Team, to attend domestic and family violence related occurrences with the first responding police.

“We instantly saw positive outcomes from day one of the trial.”

By modelling to QPS officers how a specialist worker engaged with women, the general duties officers became more empathetic in their approach, building better relationships between police and victim-survivors.

The model also involved preventative work. Repeat calls for service were targeted, and the team followed up outside of the point of crisis.

Information sharing was also improved, allowing for the responding officers to be better informed when attending occurrences.

It was also submitted that the support of the Officer in Charge was a significant contributing factor to the trial’s success, demonstrating the importance of strong leadership for these types of initiatives.

SUBMISSION FROM THE CENTRE FOR WOMEN AND CO.

Centre for Women [CFW] has been involved in a trial Co-Responder model alongside Logan Central DVET [Domestic Violence Engagement Team] for nearly 6 months and from day one we have experienced positive outcomes for women.

The learning for both CFW and QPS and the subtle (but highly impactful!) shift in police culture, understanding and approach has affirmed for all involved that this is working.

I’d also like to make special mention of Senior Sergeant, Officer in Charge (redacted), who has been instrumental in supporting the co-responder pilot to be as successful as it has been to date. I am proud of the strong respectful relationship we have built with (redacted) and his team, where we have had difficult conversations in relation to police responses and instead of being met with defensiveness, there is an openness to learn and do better. It is through working with (redacted) and his team that we are genuinely encouraged that police responses can be safer, appropriate and we can achieve best practice.

However, QPS need significant support to achieve this, the responsibility cannot be placed on one or two officers or a DFV specialist. It is imperative that all QPS officers are provided with trauma informed – best practice DFV training and are given the opportunity to connect with their local DFV specialist services to collaborate and ensure better outcomes are achieved.²⁶³

The model trialled in Logan resulted in positive outcomes for victim-survivors, particularly in cases with repeat calls for service. In the Commission’s view, this model should be trialled in other locations, and a recommendation to this effect is made at the end of this chapter.

CO-LOCATION TRIALS

As with a co-responder model, a co-location model involves police working collaboratively with specialist services. The key difference is that instead of the support worker attending calls for service with police and providing support at the scene, the worker is embedded within a police station or DFVPU and provides support to police when people attend the station, or when following up on cases.

Like P.R.A.D.O., some co-location models incorporate a co-response component. For P.R.A.D.O. caseworkers, sitting alongside police vastly improved communication around domestic and family violence and clients’ needs. For police, co-location with caseworkers provides an ‘in-house’ specialist who can respond to the needs of victim-survivors at the point of crisis and alleviate this existing responsibility from police. It also provides police

officers with the opportunity to talk to a specialist service provider when they need additional advice or support to deal with a complex case.

A further benefit is that victim-survivors who report to police can speak directly to a specialist worker, increasing the likelihood of client engagement and action.²⁶⁴

In 2021, the Gold Coast Domestic Violence Protection Centre trialled the co-location of two advocates in Southport and Coomera police stations for two days per week.²⁶⁵ A previous eight-week pilot was initiated in 2019 by a QPS Inspector to improve the experience of women attending the police station. The pilot programs ended due to lack of funding and the precarious nature of the funding for these initiatives is a barrier to their effective and ongoing implementation.

Griffith University evaluated the 2021 trial, finding that most victim-survivors reported positive experiences with police, and multiple other benefits from this approach including:

- enhanced feelings of safety
- reduced wait times
- more support
- reduced fear and anxiety talking to police
- faster referral to services
- increased likelihood of the police taking the call for service seriously.²⁶⁶

The evaluation also found that victim-survivors who met with an advocate only or an advocate and police were more likely to report increased feelings of safety than those who only met with police.²⁶⁷

There were also benefits for the organisations involved which included enhanced interagency collaboration and shared learnings, and reduced workload for the QPS.²⁶⁸ Participants recommended the continuation and expansion of the pilot to cover more days and more locations.²⁶⁹

Importantly, the evaluation identified that advocates must be placed in a highly visible and accessible location within a police station, so that they are regularly interacting with the officers and collaborating with them.²⁷⁰ There must also be a private area in the police station for the embedded advocate to speak with the victim-survivor, so that sensitive information can be shared privately.²⁷¹

Despite these positive results, the pilot was not without its challenges, which included:

- differing approaches between the advocate and QPS
- QPS staff turning victim-survivors away when the advocate was not at the station and telling them to come back when the advocate was available
- disrespect for the advocates from some QPS staff.²⁷²

However, it was ultimately considered that as the embedded specialist's role matured in a police station and the role was better recognised by QPS with appropriate procedures put in place, these challenges would be easily overcome.²⁷³

The positive outcomes seen in the evaluation of the 2021 trial in Southport and Coomera were mirrored in another trial between 2021 and 2022 at the Toowoomba police station.²⁷⁴ A specialist worker from the Domestic Violence Action Centre (DVAC) was embedded in the police station for two days a week, which later increased to four days a week.

An evaluation of the trial in Toowoomba found many benefits including:

- positive engagement with the QPS for people experiencing domestic violence²⁷⁵
- a strengthened integrated response between police and DVAC workers including the provision of real time advice to QPS officers engaging with aggrieved persons on call outs
- improved QPS understanding of referral pathways and options for people affected by domestic and family violence²⁷⁶
- recognition by police of the general benefits of having a well-integrated response to law enforcement to support victim-survivors.

As with other trials, there was an initial lack of engagement by police with the DVAC worker at the start of the placement but this was rectified by presentations to improve awareness about the trial.²⁷⁷

Close relationships with one or two key officers also helped to establish the trial, and these officers' positive view and visible use of the worker meant others then made use of her assistance.²⁷⁸

There are significant benefits in embedding domestic violence advocates in police stations and the Commission makes a recommendation about embedded workers at the end of this chapter.

CONCLUSION

Specialist resources and structures are an important part of the QPS response to domestic and family violence.

In most cases, the various specialist roles and units are over-worked and under-utilised. The capacity of these specialist resources should be extended to maximise their potential.

This will provide QPS members responding to domestic and family violence with more support and in turn improve the quality and consistency of the QPS response.

Coordination with other domestic and family violence agencies have demonstrated the potential to improve QPS responses and should continue to be explored and developed.

As the problem of domestic and family violence cannot be solved by any one organisation, greater coordination and cooperation across the agencies that respond and provide support to people experiencing domestic and family violence will benefit the community.

FINDINGS

- Domestic and Family Violence Liaison Officers and Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators are important specialist roles with the potential to be an integral part of improving Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence. These should be full-time positions with clear role descriptions.
- Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Units are an important part of the Queensland Police Service response to domestic and family violence, providing information and support to frontline officers responding to domestic and family violence. They should be established in all districts as a matter of priority, have an investigative function and have a 24 hour on call capability.
- Interagency teams, embedded workers and co-responder and co-location trials have improved the Queensland Police Service response to domestic and family violence. There is merit in the Queensland Police Service continuing to trial such initiatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 6

Within six months, the Queensland Police Service establish permanent, full-time positions with designated position descriptions detailing the functional responsibilities for:

- Domestic Violence Liaison Officers where demand requires it
- Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators.

Recommendation 7

Within 18 months, the Queensland Police Service establish a Domestic and Family Violence Vulnerable Persons Unit in each district, which, at a minimum, maintains a 24 hours per day, seven day on call response capability and includes High Risk Team members, Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators, detectives to investigate domestic and family violence occurrences, and, where practicable, domestic and family violence support workers from community organisations.

Recommendation 8

Within six months, the Queensland Police Service evaluate the application of the approved sector-wide common risk assessment framework for internal use.

Recommendation 9

Within 12 months, the Queensland Police Service formalise a trial of repeat calls for service partnerships across at least three districts based on the approach and learnings of the Logan model and at the conclusion of the trial, arrange an independent evaluation of the model to determine whether it is suitable for implementation in other districts across the state.

Recommendation 10

Within 12 months, the Queensland Government support integrated approaches to domestic and family violence at a local level by:

- providing sufficient recurrent funding to establish embedded domestic and family violence support workers in police stations wherever domestic and family violence services are available
- requiring that this arrangement is formalised through written agreement between the Queensland Police Service and the domestic and family violence service provider/s.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS

Improving the police response is essential to disrupting and preventing domestic and family violence. Creating and formalising specialist police roles, providing resources for DFVVPUs and embedding specialist workers in police stations will lead to a more holistic policing response to domestic and family violence, improve investigations and provide better responses to and support of victim-survivors.

Evaluating the application of the approved sector-wide common risk assessment framework will ensure that police are relying on the most reliable risk assessment, leading to greater protection of victim-survivors and better responses to domestic and family violence.

Importantly these measures will lead to a more holistic investigation, disruption and prevention of domestic and family violence, and help keep victim-survivors safe by engaging their rights of equality and recognition (s 15 HRA), protection of individuals and families (ss 17 and 26 HRA), right to life (s 16 HRA) liberty and security (s 29 HRA) and cultural rights (ss 27 and 28 HRA).

6 Recruitment, training and support

While specialist positions and units in the Queensland Police Service (QPS) are key to a strong response to domestic and family violence, all police have a statutory responsibility to act when a report of domestic and family violence is made to them.

To do this well, officers must have appropriate training in the dynamics of domestic and family violence, and the actions they are required to take in response to it. Procedures and systems also need to be in place to support an effective response, which make the role of police as simple as possible.

The Commission engaged the Nous Group to undertake QPS DFV-Q 2022, a survey of QPS members' views of the organisation's ability to respond to domestic and family violence. Among other things, the survey sought to understand whether the current training and support provided to the QPS membership is working well, and what needs improvement.

The Nous Group analysis of the responses provided by the 2,733 QPS members who completed the survey in July 2022 revealed 12 key themes, summarised in the table below. This shows that while QPS members have the desire and readiness to improve their responses to domestic and family violence, they feel they lack the capacity and resources to meet this challenge.

THEME	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLE RESPONSE
1	Frontline officers feel pressure and scrutiny from the growing focus placed on domestic and family violence and the QPS	<i>"Back your staff, police especially frontline police are publicly ridiculed and used as the public forum punching bags too often. Frontline police feel they have no support from senior officers and are hung out to dry all too often for any mistake."</i>
2	QPS members don't feel they have the capacity or resources to meet increasing demands for service	<i>"When you are time and resource poor, you do a much less thorough job. The increased demand and inadequate resources makes our front line police time poor and stretched and under the increased demand pressure to keep going to the next urgent job. This creates an operating environment where shortcuts, rushing or inattention to detail will occur."</i>
3	Members believe their work on domestic and family violence contributes to burn out	<i>"Too much pressure on police to be perfect. We will never be perfect. Its [sic] unfair and we are burnt out dealing with this issue!"</i>
4	There is a desire and readiness to develop a more effective police response to domestic and family violence	<i>"At present GD crews are doing their very best to respond to DV incidents in a timely manner. I believe the culture of DV has changed over the 20 plus years I've been an operational officer and all aggrieved are listened to and taken seriously."</i>
5	The QPS' statements about the importance of addressing domestic and family violence are not matched by supportive actions and organisational arrangements	<i>"If Police are looking to get a promotion or are writing their resume generally DV jobs are not the ones you are looking to put in your resume. How about we put a little bit more emphasis on DV jobs and applications as being important in Police job applications/resumes and then you might get officers more interested in actually attending these jobs and doing them well."</i>

THEME	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLE RESPONSE
6	Members have confidence in their own knowledge to deal with domestic and family violence matters effectively, and a desire to continue to learn	<i>“Vulnerable persons training and personnel including support services offers options for attending police. I feel there is sufficient training for officers who work in this area to manage DV. I feel biases of police officers towards DV and vulnerable victim-survivors has diminished due to this training.”</i>
7	QPS efforts to support members in their domestic and family violence work have not always realised intended benefits	<i>“OLPs [Online Learning Products] do not cut the mustard. I have spoken to many officers who’ve reported not getting any learning experiences out of OLPs.”</i>
8	Explaining the importance of domestic and family violence policing responses is required to help members better appreciate their roles and processes	<i>“It’s getting too confusing with all the terms and now Police are becoming quasi social workers and psychologists. On top of dealing with mental health call outs Police are not dealing with crime but social issues.”</i>
9	Good work in domestic and family violence delivers different outcomes which are not recognised and regarded as highly as other police priorities	<i>“Although police attend and conduct the necessary DFV investigations, resulting in whatever outcome, if the aggrieved does not want to make a complaint which is probably 95% of the time due to the conflicting nature with the respondent, he will not be criminally charged on this occasion.”</i>
10	There is a need for strong messaging, transparent communication, and follow-through from leaders	<i>“Senior managers continuously throwing junior officers under the bus when a DV complaint is made. This is totally counter productive. DV complaints will happen... This is the nature of the job. There’s no need to throw junior officers under the bus all the time.”</i>
11	Members would value closer relationships with partner agencies and services, especially after hours	<i>“QPS is the only agency responding 24/7 and the support that is required is not available after hours from housing to assisting with children involved. Every agency is the first to criticise and point the blame at the QPS but the QPS is doing the best it can in what feels like a losing battle.”</i>
12	There is need for practical and timely advice and support from those with specialist domestic and family violence knowledge	<i>“I would suggest that given there is a unit in CIB specifically for investigating property crime there should probably be a similar unit for DV matters that enter into the more serious realms of stalking, financial abuse and assaults. One or two DVLO’s in an area isn’t nearly enough.”</i>

Figure 19: Summary of key themes identified in the QPS DFV-Q Findings Report²⁷⁹

Other evidence before the Commission shows that officers often feel ill-equipped to respond to domestic and family violence. In a 2021 Longitudinal Study of First Year Constables in the QPS, officers described responding to domestic and family violence as the most complex of their tasks.²⁸⁰ In that study, the First Year Constables described feeling overwhelmed and underprepared to respond. One First Year Constable reported:

[i]t's a running joke, basically, that no one ever feels ready to hit the ground. No one ever feels like the Academy taught them enough to be a police officer.²⁸¹

The recruits who did feel prepared and ready largely nominated their previous professional and life experience as the reason for that readiness.²⁸²

To respond effectively to domestic and family violence, the QPS needs a workforce that reflects the diversity of Queensland, and is comprised of officers who are appropriately trained and supported to do their job.

The Commission examined the current recruitment practices and training, including domestic and family violence training provided to recruits, First Year Constables and general duties officers. It also examined the supports provided to officers to respond to domestic and family violence.

RECRUITMENT

QPS recruits are typically male (76%) and identify as non-Indigenous.²⁸³ While the QPS has a Diversity and Inclusion statement,²⁸⁴ evidence has shown that cultural diversity is not sufficiently encouraged or supported in the workforce, with some QPS members reporting they have not felt culturally safe when working in the QPS (considered further in Part 4 of this Report).

Candidates who wish to join the QPS must first take a cognitive test²⁸⁵ before undergoing a vetting process.²⁸⁶ This is followed by physical, medical and psychological testing and an interview which focuses on the applicant's reasons for joining the QPS and how their personal values align with QPS values.

In July 2022, the QPS lowered the minimum age at which an applicant can apply to be a recruit from 18 years to 17 years old.²⁸⁷ Seventeen year old applicants cannot commence at the Academy until they are 18 years of age. The change was in response to difficulties recruiting enough officers because of record low rates of unemployment in Australia.²⁸⁸

When asked about this policy change, Acting Assistant Commissioner Mark Kelly from the People Capability Command told the Commission that recruiting young people can be advantageous as:

[t]hey generally don't have biases. They can be taught new processes and they can come from diverse backgrounds. They can be people who have come from backgrounds of domestic and family violence themselves.²⁸⁹

The QPS previously had a program designed for applicants as young as 16 years through a cadet program. The *Report of a Commission of Inquiry pursuant to orders in council* (1989) (the Fitzgerald Report) found that the relative youth and inexperience of cadets, who came straight from the classroom meant that they were not prepared for the “*unpleasant aspects of policing*” and that recruits with more maturity, education or work experience beyond high school had a “*better grounding for police work*.”²⁹⁰ There was also a concern about the influence of older, jaded and, in the Fitzgerald era, corrupt officers on very young officers. Accordingly, the Fitzgerald Report included a recommendation that the QPS stop recruiting people who had just left school.

Given the extent of the cultural issues identified by the Commission, there is a similar risk that younger recruits might be influenced by the views and attitudes of their senior officers. This is compounded by the culture of fear and silence that prevents officers from speaking out or raising concerns about problematic behaviour by other police.

Professor Heather Douglas, from the Melbourne Law School at the University of Melbourne, told the Commission that improvement in the police response to domestic and family violence is “*not assisted by bringing in very young people into the Police Service, especially given the complex social problems that police are routinely called to deal with*.”²⁹¹ With reference to the recommendations made in the Fitzgerald Report, Professor Douglas noted that responses will not improve by “*going backwards in terms of recruitment to uneducated police officers*.”²⁹²

Professor Douglas said that if younger people are recruited to join the QPS, it would be necessary to carefully consider the stations where First Year Constables are placed to ensure they receive appropriate mentoring and support by officers who are trained to do so.²⁹³

When Professor Douglas was questioned at a Commission hearing by counsel for the QPS, she said there are problems associated with placing young recruits straight out of school into complex domestic and family violence situations.²⁹⁴ She suggested that a recruitment strategy that emphasised that a substantial proportion of police work involves assisting victim-survivors of domestic and family violence may help to attract candidates from human services and behavioural sciences backgrounds. Such a strategy would also give recruits a full appreciation of the realities and practicalities of policing domestic and family violence, which the Commission heard is often lacking.²⁹⁵

Counsel for the QPS also suggested that younger recruits may be able to pursue further study during their career as police. Professor Douglas agreed that tertiary study would at least expose younger recruits to a wider circle of influence outside the QPS.

The Commission notes that current QPS recruiting material seeks to increase the gender and cultural diversity of the QPS membership.²⁹⁶ Further, the QPS has previously attempted to increase the number of female recruits through initiatives such as a 50/50 gender equity recruitment strategy. In May 2021, the Crime and Corruption Commission released a report into the strategy which, among other things, recommended that the QPS “*engage the Queensland Human Rights Commission about the need to increase diversity in the QPS, and develop and implement appropriate strategies to address this*.”²⁹⁷

The current recruitment strategy of the QPS needs to be strengthened to ensure the QPS attracts applicants who will be best placed to respond effectively to domestic and family violence. Accordingly, the Commission makes a recommendation in relation to recruitment strategies at the end of this chapter.

FIRST YEAR CONSTABLE PROGRAM

The Recruit Training Program is designed to equip recruits with the necessary theoretical knowledge and skills to perform their duties as a police officer and, relevantly to this Report, appropriately respond to domestic and family violence.

When recruits graduate from the Academy, they enter the First Year Constable Program, where each new Constable works with a more experienced officer (a Field Training Officer). This is intended to ensure that their theoretical knowledge is applied correctly in practice.²⁹⁸ The 2021 Longitudinal Study of First Year Constables noted that:

First Year Constables describe the role of the Field Training Officer as pivotal not only to their development, but also to their feelings about the job, the degree to which they feel they belong, their physical and psychological safety and their confidence.²⁹⁹

The program is split into four phases to ensure that the experience and skills that a First Year Constable learns on the job are developing adequately during the year.³⁰⁰ Further training is also provided to First Year Constables in the first and second phases of the program, with a requirement that work samples are provided as evidence of their competence before they move from the probationary program at the end of 12 months.³⁰¹

Studies on leadership within the QPS showed that the First Year Constable Program focused almost exclusively on technical and operational capability development, and relied heavily on the Field Training Officer's capability, experience and motivation.³⁰² The study also revealed there was "little if any" focus on leadership development of First Year Constables.³⁰³

The importance of the role of a Field Training Officer cannot be understated. When Sergeant Paul Trinder gave evidence at a Commission hearing about a Field Training Officer shirking his duty by avoiding taking out a Protection Order application and lying to his shift supervisor about it,³⁰⁴ the incident provided a stark example of how easily a young officer can be shown bad practices by lazy and inept senior officers.

No amount of training at the Academy is likely to counter this type of influence. The community should be confident that the officer appointed as a Field Training Officer is able to guide and mentor the First Year Constable to become a police officer with adequate skills, sound ethics and an enthusiastic and empathetic attitude. The importance of the role was underscored by the Fitzgerald Report:

It is essential that revised standards of training that stress integrity and the proper use of police discretion are reinforced during initial placement periods at training stations.

Practices learnt and experience gained during the first few months on the job are a powerful influence on the development of new recruits and their future attitudes towards policing and the community...

The best supervisors in the Force, with demonstrated integrity and commitment to the principles of reform, should be made available to closely direct and coach new recruits at training stations. This needs to be a full-time task given top priority and supported by regular contact with the inspectorate to ensure acceptable standards of performance, and individual development are achieved.³⁰⁵

Currently, the QPS is not consistently achieving the high standard needed for this mentorship and envisaged by the Fitzgerald Report. Field Training Officers undergo a two-day course to become accredited.³⁰⁶ This training is designed to develop their leadership skills and ability to make a positive impact on First Year Constables.

The Commission was advised that there are QPS Guidelines for the selection of suitable Field Training Officers to ensure the officers appointed are qualified and experienced.³⁰⁷ However, it is clear these Guidelines are not always properly applied. During its hearings, the Commission heard from a Constable based in Townsville who graduated from the Academy on 25 May 2020, had completed the First Year Constable Program and was already a Field Training Officer.³⁰⁸ The Commission heard of another instance in which an officer was approached to undertake Field Training Officer training three days after completing the First Year Constable Program.³⁰⁹

While some consideration must be given to operational needs in regional areas, there are disparities in the way the First Year Constable Program is delivered. For example, in Mount Isa, a First Year Constable is teamed with one Field Training Officer for one month, before they are rotated to another Field Training Officer.³¹⁰ After the first two months the only requirement is that they are on duty at least 50% of the time with a Field Training Officer.³¹¹ This is compared to the more careful approach in Logan where Field Training Officers are paired with First Year Constables with compatible personalities to ensure the best learning environment possible.³¹²

A Field Training Officer has a substantial impact on a new recruit's professional development and attitudes. It is essential that they are experienced and suitable for this role. The Commission makes a recommendation about Field Training Officers at the end of this chapter.

TRAINING

Many police told the Commission that the current training provided by the QPS is inadequate and that they do not feel they are equipped to respond to domestic and family violence related calls for service to the best of their ability. Officers reported that:

- it had been a long time since they had received face-to-face training³¹³
- online training is not effective³¹⁴

- officers are not given time to properly engage with the training³¹⁵
- many officers share the answers to the Online Learning Product questions to save time and there is a ‘cheat sheet’ at stations for officers to use to input the correct answers³¹⁶
- they learn better when they can test their knowledge and ask questions in a class environment.³¹⁷

The Commission heard from many academics and community organisations who reported that there was a general lack of understanding among police of the control tactics employed by perpetrators of domestic and family violence.³¹⁸

This was particularly the case where there was non-physical abuse³¹⁹ or during periods of relationship separation.³²⁰ The Commission heard from Professor Douglas, and Betty Taylor (from the Red Rose Foundation), that:

[Some police do not understand] ...that part of the dynamic of DFV is that women have often been threatened with many actions should they leave, they often know leaving at that moment may be more dangerous for them or their children than staying and they may be concerned about their children and what will happen to them if they leave, they may also be concerned about their financial or housing circumstances or their visa status.³²¹

[There can be implicit bias amongst police] ... around stereotyped expectations about victims and...assumptions about perpetrators.³²²

There is a misconception both within QPS and the wider community that non-physical abuse is less serious.³²³

Training delivered by people with lived experience of domestic and family violence would assist police to develop a greater understanding of domestic and family violence and its impacts. Acting Assistant Commissioner Mark Kelly confirmed that, as at July 2022, no presenters with a lived experience of domestic and family violence attend the Academy to speak to recruits about their personal experience.³²⁴

The QPS previously had an arrangement with the Brisbane Domestic Violence Service (BDVS) and other organisations for victim-survivors to attend the Academy to give recruits an opportunity to see domestic and family violence through the lens of a victim-survivor, to ask questions, and challenge their preconceptions about domestic and family violence.³²⁵

This arrangement ceased around the time of the COVID-19 pandemic and has not recommenced,³²⁶ despite presenters telling the Commission that engaging with the recruits had been worthwhile.³²⁷ However, on 27 October 2022, the QPS advised the Commission that a not for profit domestic and family violence organisation has been engaged to provide lived experience training to recruits, commencing on 10 November 2022.³²⁸

Whilst the pandemic undoubtedly caused difficulties with face-to-face training, nonetheless many businesses managed to continue to engage trainers remotely during

the pandemic and training has been resumed for some time now at the Academy. It is unsatisfactory that the QPS has not sought to continue with this important aspect of training until only very recently and it is important the efforts made toward incorporating this aspect of training continue and extend to training provided beyond the Academy. The Commission makes a recommendation about training at the end of this chapter.

In submissions about the QPS response to domestic and family violence, academics and community organisations also reported that, from their experience, police sometimes had a poor understanding of, and therefore need for training regarding:

- the operation and intent of the *Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012* (DFVPA) which differentiates between acts of violence designed to create fear, and those that are defensive or reactive in nature³²⁹
- cultural relationships and community dynamics which can result in police disengagement and an unwillingness to intervene³³⁰
- resistive violence and related issues, leading to police misidentifying the person most in need of protection³³¹ particularly for First Nations women.³³² This also has significant implications for victim-survivors from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds³³³
- the specialist domestic and family violence support sector within the QPS.³³⁴

The need for training improvements have been identified in numerous previous reviews and reports, including:

- **2015:** the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence (2015), which recommended that the QPS facilitate an external, independent audit and review of training packages to assess the appropriateness and frequency of compulsory professional development opportunities relevant to domestic and family violence.³³⁵
- **2015:** the State Coroner recommended the extension of the above recommendation of the Special Taskforce to all staff within the QPS likely to have contact with domestic and family violence situations, irrespective of whether they are administrative or sworn officers.³³⁶
- **2017:** the Domestic and Family Violence Death Review and Advisory Board recommended the QPS continue to develop training targeted at first responding officers to domestic and family violence related occurrences, with a focus on the risk indicators and broader dynamics of domestic and family violence.³³⁷
- **2017:** the Central Queensland University Evaluation of QPS Training made several recommendations including the development of a state-wide domestic and family violence education and training framework, with mandatory annual refresher training,³³⁸ use of external speakers from support agencies,³³⁹ training to improve communication and interpersonal skills³⁴⁰ and training in domestic and family violence dynamics.³⁴¹
- **2019:** the QPS Domestic and Family Violence Culture Review recommended effective role/rank specific process/procedural training³⁴² and training to take account of differences in the levels and prevalence of domestic and family violence in regional and remote areas.³⁴³

- **2021:** the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce recommended the QPS continue to develop and deliver ongoing evidence-based and trauma-informed domestic and family violence and coercive control training and education to all levels of the service.³⁴⁴
- **2021:** the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce also recommended regular specialist training for police prosecutors, and training on the nature and impact of domestic and family violence, relevant legislation, local support services and pathways for referrals.³⁴⁵

In 2022, Deputy State Coroner Jane Bentley handed down findings in relation to two separate domestic and family violence related homicides: the death of Doreen Langham³⁴⁶ and the deaths of Hannah Clarke and her children, Aaliyah Baxter, Laianah Baxter and Trey Baxter.³⁴⁷

In both cases, findings outlined that police officers were under-trained in relation to domestic and family violence

and that immediate comprehensive training was urgently required to bring all police up to date with amendments in domestic violence legislation and relevant research, and that annual refresher training was required.

Deputy State Coroner Bentley’s conclusions recognised that the COVID-19 pandemic greatly impacted QPS training and staffing around the time of Ms Langham’s death. Her Honour also acknowledged that a multi-disciplinary approach to domestic and family violence is required, and police cannot be expected to be trained in social work, psychology or as lawyers.³⁴⁸

The following diagram summarises the training provided to QPS members on domestic and family violence. Training is mandatory in the Recruit Training Program and as a First Year Constable, but any subsequent specialised domestic and family violence training is largely voluntary.



Figure 20: Domestic and family violence training provided to QPS members³⁴⁹

While the QPS does provide training for domestic and family violence much of this occurs at a very early stage in a police officer's career. In his statement to the Commission, Acting Assistant Commissioner Kelly described a review and current rewrite of the recruit training curriculum which commenced in 2021 and will expand domestic and family violence related training for recruits from nine days to 19 days.³⁵⁰

TRAINING PROVIDED AFTER THE ACADEMY

On 8 June 2022, QPS members attended the Commission's office to explain the training that will be provided by the QPS to its officers. During this meeting, the Commission was told that there was an upcoming three day training pilot, called Domestic and Family Violence: The Holistic Approach, which focused on:

- domestic and family violence investigations
- coercive control
- the DV-PAF³⁵¹ and risk assessment
- the impact of culture on domestic and family violence policing responses.

The training was independently evaluated by Dr Peter Ninnes from the Australian National Research Organisation on Women's Safety (ANROWS),³⁵² who identified that a stronger emphasis on the gendered nature of domestic and family violence was needed:

Although gender inequality is widely acknowledged as a main driver of domestic and family violence, the training materials provided do not address this issue nor the impact of sexism and misogyny on how women in the QPS, DFV advocates and women victims and survivors are viewed and treated by other officers, and how this impacts QPS responses to DFV call outs... the course materials appear to skirt around the issue.³⁵³

It is unknown if the QPS adopted the suggested changes to the course, however, it is now being progressively made available to all police officers.

Investing in training takes time, it takes officers off the road, and it requires continued reinforcement to be effective. The practicalities of training police were highlighted by Mr Ian Leavers, President of the QPUE, who said *"for every day training that's 12,500 shifts lost."*³⁵⁴

Officers also need sufficient time to complete training for it to be effective. Training offered by way of Online Learning Products is often conducted in between jobs. The Commission heard of stations where answer books were shared between officers. Rushed training is unlikely to be useful in building knowledge and skills. Mr Leavers described the deficiencies in training delivered by Online Learning Products in the following way:

You can do an online learning product... They do half an hour, they go out to a job, they go back and do a bit more. It's not meaningful training.³⁵⁵

The lack of consistency in training was a concern noted by Professor Heather Douglas who recommended that all police need regular training about coercive control and controlling behaviour, as well as the myths and misunderstandings surrounding domestic and family violence.³⁵⁶ When asked what constituted 'regular' training, Professor Douglas referred to research which suggests refresher training every eight months is beneficial, though she noted it may not be possible for QPS officers to be trained that frequently.³⁵⁷

Similar concerns were raised by Professor Silke Meyer, who noted that *"police upskilling in domestic and family violence informed practice is critical and should be supported through initial, regular and ongoing professional development."*³⁵⁸

The Commission accepts there are clear practical difficulties when considering how to best implement consistent and effective training across the entirety of the QPS. However, a sustained investment in this training is essential given the significant pressures the QPS faces in responding to domestic and family violence.

A recommendation was made by Deputy State Coroner Jane Bentley that police receive mandatory, annual, face to face training on domestic and family violence.³⁵⁹ During evidence to the Commission, both Assistant Commissioner Codd and Acting Assistant Commissioner Kelly agreed that annual training would be beneficial to QPS members. Assistant Commissioner Codd noted that *"...at the bare minimum there needs to be an across-the-board whole-of-service annual update."*³⁶⁰ Acting Assistant Commissioner Kelly stated *"we'll need to do more training...it will have to be annual training."*³⁶¹

The Commission heard from an experienced Officer in Charge of a busy station that having senior officers regularly meet with and review the body worn camera footage of more junior officers to give constructive feedback is a useful teaching tool.³⁶²

Receiving feedback is an integral part of both training and consistent upskilling. It is likely that ongoing one-on-one training of this kind would assist police officers to embed their domestic and family violence training, and demonstrate to both the officer and their supervisor that the officer has not only built the knowledge, but can put it into practice in the field. The Commission makes a recommendation to this effect at the end of this chapter.

GAPS IN THE CURRENT DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE TRAINING

The Commission heard, from victim-survivors and community organisations, of many occasions when police had failed to take appropriate action to commence proceedings for Protection Orders and criminal charges.

The Commission also heard from police prosecutors who had seen instances where police officers had failed to take appropriate action. On some occasions when police fail to take out a Protection Order application or lay criminal charges, the failure to act appears to be a result of a lack of understanding of the law and evidentiary requirements for the relevant proceedings. At times police officers do not commence proceedings for Protection Orders or criminal charges unless there is evidence in addition to the testimony of the person affected by domestic and family violence to support the proceedings.³⁶³

Importantly, additional evidence beyond that person's testimony is not necessary for the making of a Protection Order application, nor, necessarily, a barrier to the success of the application. It is concerning that Protection Order applications are not, in some cases, made when they should be because of a lack of understanding of the law.

On some occasions, police officers fail to commence criminal proceedings associated with a domestic and family violence related occurrence. This can be because they have asked a complainant, at the scene of an incident, whether they wished to make a criminal complaint without encouraging them, or explaining the process to them.³⁶⁴ On occasions, criminal charges are not pursued because a victim-survivor is not willing to make a complaint, despite there being grounds to lay a charge without their complaint.³⁶⁵ In such cases, it is clear that the lack of action is a result of a lack of legal understanding on the part of the police officer.

In some cases, police officers rush through taking information from a person impacted by domestic and family violence at the scene rather than seeking to understand the whole story in a trauma-informed way.³⁶⁶ In others, police officers lack basic skills about the information required for court documents. Either scenario can result in:

- Protection Order applications that do not provide sufficient information to establish why it is necessary and desirable that an order be made³⁶⁷
- bail affidavits that lack important information³⁶⁸
- bail objections lacking in important information such as the strength of the evidence³⁶⁹
- breach files with insufficient information about the nature and seriousness of the breach.³⁷⁰

This lack of basic knowledge not only undermines the proceedings but may also place a person experiencing violence at increased risk from a perpetrator.

In some cases, breach proceedings are not commenced because they involve breaches that police consider trivial, despite the complainant wanting to proceed.³⁷¹ These occurrences suggest a lack of understanding about how perpetrators maintain and build control in a relationship, and the risks posed by these actions which might appear to be minor when viewed in isolation. It is concerning that police officers might not always charge breaches where there is evidence to do so, in circumstances where failing to act may embolden the perpetrator and expose the victim-survivor to further harm. This will be a particular challenge with the planned introduction of an offence of coercive control in Queensland.

In some cases, police officers also fail to seek appropriate conditions on Protection Order applications,³⁷² or fail to name children on an application because they do not understand that witnessing the violence is sufficient to warrant them being protected, even if they were not physically harmed.³⁷³ When this occurs, children who ought to be protected by Protection Orders do not receive the protection they deserve.

The Commission also heard that police officers sometimes do not use interpreters,³⁷⁴ or do not use appropriate techniques to take evidence from young people,³⁷⁵ or people with a disability.³⁷⁶ The failure of police officers to employ these fairly basic skills plainly contributes to a risk that action which ought to be taken may not be.

Training about the law and basic interviewing techniques and skills is important to improving QPS responses to domestic and family violence. The Commission, having heard of occasions where a failure to act appears to be a result of a lack of training or basic understanding of the law or interviewing skills, considers that the QPS must review its training for police officers in these areas. A recommendation to this effect is made at the end of this chapter.

The Commission received a submission from the QPUE advocating for the introduction of a criminal offence of 'commit domestic violence'.³⁷⁷ The QPUE noted that without this offence, "...the initial protection, and proceedings, remain civil in nature. This is a largely unfamiliar area for most police and does not sit comfortably with traditional police training."³⁷⁸ Mr Leavers, President of the QPUE, said that the offence would allow for protection of a victim-survivor by the imposition of bail conditions prohibiting contact, which could be ordered by the court to continue even if the criminal offence was dismissed.³⁷⁹

However, there are several difficulties associated with the proposed offence, including that the protection described by Mr Leavers can already be achieved through Protection Orders. The application for a Protection Order is assessed against the lower, civil standard of proof. If police are currently unable to meet the civil standard of proof in court, they will not be able to achieve the higher standard required for a criminal offence. The remedy for QPS members who lack familiarity with civil proceedings is training, not the creation of a criminal offence which is harder to prove. Further, the criminalisation of domestic and family violence in this way could have the unintended consequence of further over-policing of First Nations peoples. The QPS did not support the creation of this offence, noting that it could lead to over-criminalisation.³⁸⁰

SPECIALIST FIVE DAY DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE TRAINING

The QPS introduced a five day specialist domestic and family violence training course in 2017. The targeted participants included Domestic and Family Violence Liaison Officers and investigators, prosecutors and those working in the vulnerable persons unit, and criminal investigation and child protection units.³⁸¹ The course was not mandatory and there was a prerequisite that participants must have a foundational knowledge of the role of a DFVC.³⁸²

The course was intended to provide participants with the knowledge and skills that allow DFVCs to identify gaps in a domestic and family violence investigation. The information provided was beyond that given to a general duties officer and some of the key learning areas taught during the course included dynamics of abuse, risk factors and assessments, investigations techniques, the role of DFVCs, DVLOs and other specialist roles, vulnerable victim-survivors and prosecutions.³⁸³

There is clear merit in this training. Increased and improved knowledge in those key learning areas will greatly assist officers in their response to domestic and family violence.

Although the course was developed in response to the recommendations made by the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence (2015) and only commenced in 2017, it was last delivered in 2019.³⁸⁴

The specialist course is currently undergoing redevelopment and eight of the twelve learning outcomes of the former five day course have been included in the Holistic Approach Training.³⁸⁵

The QPS has indicated it intends to develop an updated Domestic and Family Violence Specialist Course for delivery in the 2022-23 training curriculum.³⁸⁶

The target group for the updated course is the same as those for the five day course and it is not mandatory for those in specialist roles.³⁸⁷ Acting Assistant Commissioner Mark Kelly informed the Commission it was intended the course would be completed by 100 members in the first year and the training will continue to other members in the following years.³⁸⁸

It is unsatisfactory that such critically important training is not mandatory for those who undertake specialist domestic and family violence roles. The Commission makes a recommendation that this or similar training should be mandatory to those in specialist roles.

SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE RESPONSES

While training is critical to improve QPS members' understanding of domestic and family violence and how they are required to respond, this also needs to be supported by clear procedural guidance and easy to use systems.

The Operational Procedures Manual (OPM) which provides guidance to officers about their legislative and procedural obligations is not clear, accessible, or fit for purpose. Police must also refer to other information, such as Commissioner's Directions, to guide their decision making, making it difficult for officers to quickly source the information they need to do the job effectively.

For example, the current OPM indicates a QPS member can finalise a domestic and family violence call for service as 'DV – other' when domestic and family violence has occurred but not appropriate to apply for a Protection Order. The OPM provides further examples of circumstances where it would not be appropriate to apply for a Protection Order, including when the victim-survivor is not in fear of the perpetrator.³⁸⁹ This is problematic given the significant issues previously identified with the way police assess and understand risk within the context of domestic and family violence, including assessments of a victim-survivor's sense of fear. This is further complicated for victim-survivors who may feel that it is not safe to discuss their experiences of violence with police, and for First Nations peoples and people from a culturally and linguistically diverse background who may also have a genuine fear of engaging with police.

This is a clear deficiency in the OPM, as reliance on a perception of the absence of fear can result in police officers not taking the necessary steps for protection. A recent intelligence assessment completed in the Mt Isa District identified that reliance on the OPM in its current form to finalise domestic and family violence related calls for service as 'DV-Other Action' without accommodating cultural differences is highly likely to continue to produce inconsistent outcomes for victim-survivors who require protection.³⁹⁰ To better take into account these issues, the intelligence assessment recommended that the current OPMs be amended, to "ensure 'a person's fear of domestic violence' and 'a person's experience of domestic violence' are addressed, with the latter acting as a safeguard for cultural differences."³⁹¹

In the Commission's view, it would be valuable for the QPS to consult with officers who regularly refer to the OPM to ensure that, as it relates to domestic and family violence, it achieves its purpose.

On 24 June 2022, the Commission was advised that a manual to "provide a singular repository of domestic and family violence information predominantly for frontline officers to access" was nearing completion, and was in the final stages of editing, before being produced and made available to QPS personnel (the Manual).³⁹²

A draft copy of the Manual was provided to the Commission. The Commission reviewed it and observed there were some obvious gaps in its content, that it was voluminous and unwieldy and contained a statement at the beginning of it which suggested that it should be read in conjunction with the legislation, OPM and virtually any other document or instruction relevant to domestic and family violence.³⁹³

On 11 July 2022 Assistant Commissioner Codd gave evidence and stated the "content is all but done"³⁹⁴ and that the remainder of the work to be done was "more editorial than content."³⁹⁵ At the same hearing, the Commission raised various issues with the Manual with Assistant Commissioner Codd, including that:

- in its current state it would add to the burden of frontline officers³⁹⁶
- the Manual failed to refer to domestic and family violence being a gendered issue³⁹⁷
- it did not provide sufficient practical assistance about when interviews should be conducted or criminal charges should be investigated.

Assistant Commissioner Codd also acknowledged the development of the Manual was reflective of the Command's lack of resourcing and the difficulty of balancing short-term benefits to the frontline against "investment in strategy and processes and procedures that we know will help us in the longer term."³⁹⁸ This conflict, and the desire to produce the Manual quickly, rather than ensuring it would be a useful document in the long-term, was evident.

Assistant Commissioner Codd was asked to comment at the hearing on whether the Manual should acknowledge domestic and family violence as a gendered issue. He said:

I certainly think that's an important enough issue that it should find its way into this tool... that's an important enough issue. It shouldn't have been missed.³⁹⁹

On 28 July 2022 at a hearing, Professor Douglas was asked to comment on whether the lack of reference to domestic and family violence being a gendered issue was a significant omission. She said:

I would have thought, given the statistics on domestic and family violence...a woman is probably the greatest risk of experiencing domestic and family violence. Obviously there are many others but, if we look at who is most likely to experience it, it is women.⁴⁰⁰

On 4 August 2022, Assistant Commissioner Codd was recalled to give evidence and was asked about the progress of the domestic and family violence Manual. He gave evidence that it had not been completed and was unlikely to be completed before the Commission completed its inquiry due to current resource allocation,⁴⁰¹ and that areas of deficiency brought to the QPS's attention by the Commission were to be reviewed with a "hell of a lot more scrutiny."⁴⁰²

The Commission spoke with members of the Command and was told a single Senior Sergeant and their administrative officer were tasked to draft the Manual. This is another example of the under-resourcing of the Command, particularly given the scale and importance of the Manual, and the timeframes for its completion.⁴⁰³

It is unsatisfactory that the QPS does not have a manual to provide to its members which is fit for purpose and assists them in their responses to domestic and family violence and the Commission encourages the ongoing development of the Manual and suggests it be done in consultation with frontline officers to ensure it is useful in the field. In addition to the Manual, the QPS should also provide officers with a pocket-sized checklist of the crucial steps that must be taken when they arrive at a domestic and family violence incident to ensure they have immediate access to information and to minimise the risk of steps being missed. The Commission makes recommendations to this effect at the end of this chapter.

The Commission observed an anomaly in the operation of the *Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012* which has the potential to leave victim-survivors unprotected. Section 113 of the Act has the effect that if, in a busy callover, a Magistrate does not make a Temporary Protection Order when a Police Protection Notice (PPN) comes before the Court, the PPN will cease to operate, leaving a victim-survivor unprotected in the period between then and the adjourned proceedings. In the Commission's view, this situation can be easily rectified by legislative amendment and a recommendation to that effect is made at the end of this chapter.

STREAMLINING ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS

In a recent study conducted by the QPS, First Year Constables described responding to domestic and family violence and the associated administrative requirements as the most complex of their tasks.⁴⁰⁴ In the same study, officers said QPS databases such as QPRIME were not intuitive, and even after being in the field for over two months, they still struggled to understand what content was required in various reports. The Longitudinal Study of 2021 Recruits found:

Two thirds of First Year Constables nominated reporting and paperwork as their greatest challenge, particularly not knowing what information goes in what system, what the overall purpose of each system is and how each system operates.⁴⁰⁵

Other officers told the Commission that they feel that new initiatives result in them undertaking more processes, further paperwork, and their job ultimately becoming more

difficult.⁴⁰⁶ Acting Senior Sergeant Danny Haberland, who is the Officer in Charge of the Yarrabah police station, told the Commission that:

In my experience, and anecdotally, the changes are received by police as being to the detriment of front-line officers which make their job harder, with no apparent benefit to the aggrieved... most general duties police officers that I have interacted with feel immense pressure and stress when investigating DV which stems from the overly complex procedures that police officers are required to comply with.⁴⁰⁷

Respondents to the QPS DFV-Q 2022 survey provided the following feedback about the administrative tasks involved in undertaking their work:

The red tape around reporting is absurd, it's no wonder there is 'DV fatigue'. The scrutiny is horrendous and causes so much pressure on frontline police that many can't handle it. There are loads of members on long term sick leave because of it.

Way too much red tape with reporting requirements, checking PAFs, approvals from DDO then reviews task sent. Community complains police are not doing anything with crime its because they are at some repeat CFS DV they need to write war and peace about to cover them if something goes wrong. Simplify the DV reporting process to have more time on the road.

Cut the red tape, make processes with less duplicities, place the blame on the offenders who perpetrate the DV rather than the Police responding. We do the best we can with what's provided to us but it's not fair to be held accountable for other peoples actions we have no control over.

There is so much red tape because it is a civil matter. Police are trusted with a gun but need a witness to sign statements of service - aren't we trusted. The document service process needs to be simplified, again because its civil the processes are onerous on our resources.

CUT THE RED TAPE and CUT THE PAPERWORK. Police are completely burnt out, loath attending DV's and probably aren't doing their best job responding because of the red tape. The process is too long.

I can arrest, charge, deprive someone of their liberties but to tell some bloke to stop bashing his missus I need a sergeant's authorisation. The

sergeants and senior sergeants deal with so many PPN requests their approval is almost automatic and so largely redundant.

There is currently so much paperwork, red tape, scrutiny involved with DV that when you combine that with the sheer volume of DV we are attending, officers are becoming more and more burnt out and less and less empathetic.

Electronic service of paperwork, it is 2022.⁴⁰⁸

The Commission heard many examples of duplication in processes that was unnecessarily burdensome. For example, there is overlap in the work required to produce police documents, such as a PPN, DV Application and DV Application to Vary, and many of them serve the same function.

While they were intended to make it easier for officers to respond to domestic and family violence, PPNs also require approval of a person of at least the rank of Sergeant or Senior Sergeant, depending on the conditions included. In remote areas it can be difficult to obtain approval for a PPN. Applications for a Protection Order have no such requirement.

A hearing for the application of a Protection Order must occur no more than 28 days after a PPN is issued by a police officer.⁴⁰⁹ In this time, an officer must compile the paperwork and evidence necessary for the hearing. This short timeframe adds to the extra burden and time pressures associated with responding to domestic and family violence.

The convoluted and complicated nature of the processes and paperwork around domestic and family violence were discussed at a hearing by Assistant Commissioner Codd. He said:

We are very, very keen on examining all measures that can streamline or make more efficient some of the incredibly burdensome administrative components of responding to DFV that our officers tell us impacts on their time to do as good a job as they want to.⁴¹⁰

While the Command is aware of the issue and has attempted to influence changes, they have been impeded by “legislative and policy requirements that we don’t control.”⁴¹¹ An example of this is that, at present, police must at times file physical copies of domestic and family violence applications in the Magistrates Court. Rather than an ability to instantly file an application electronically, police officers must take time out of their shift to drive to a courthouse and file the documents in person.

There is some scope to streamline processes. Currently, the QPS estimates that ‘paperwork’ and other related administrative tasks to be completed after attendance at a scene, where no criminal investigation is commenced, take three hours to finalise and involve the following:⁴¹²

- basic occurrence creation (20 minutes)
- updating custody reports and location search reports (20 minutes)

- completing a report which includes drafting the grounds for the application or PPN (90 minutes)
- validating the documents, generating documents, printing documents, signing the documents, scanning documents (15 minutes)
- compiling aggrieved and respondent documents and commencing prosecutions notification workflow (15 minutes)
- shift supervisor review and transfer to prosecutions (20 minutes).

The Commission received submissions from police officers who were concerned the current methods for measuring success in investigations places pressure on frontline police to finish their tasks in the shortest time possible, rather than taking the extra time that might be needed to extract necessary details from victim-survivors. In that respect, QPS members told the Commission:

Officers are encouraged to be offender and incident focused, and not victim centric by the way their performance is measured. An example is by way of KPIs [Key Performance Indicators] of response times.

The pressure to achieve this KPI is pushed back on to frontline officers. Meaning that [they] are encouraged to spend as little time as possible on each job, so that they can get to the next job in a quick response time.

There is no focus on the quality of the work, only the quantity.

I personally have been pressured to have victims withdraw their complaints to have the matter solved on QPRIME so that the clear up rate of a particular crime class appears better. I have observed this to particularly [be] the case in sexual assault and rape matters.⁴¹³

There are so many limitations with the time that front line Police have to spend with an aggrieved person to gain a true understanding and appreciation for what they have gone through. There is such a push from the bosses above to get the job done in the fastest time possible, so that Police can get to the next job due to a lack in resources.⁴¹⁴

Policing domestic and family violence is complex, stressful and dangerous. Taking the time to make a careful assessment of a situation is crucial. A quick judgement that is not informed by a full assessment of the facts can have significant consequences for victim-survivors including exposing them to further trauma and abuse. Pressure to do something quickly, rather than having the confidence to complete it thoroughly, places officers in a position of conflict. In this regard, an officer told Mr Ainsworth that:

Time pressures of completing one job in order to get to the next job in a timely manner is impacting on front line officers. This in turn impacts on the standard of investigations undertaken at DV matters and the quality of the response.⁴¹⁵

Women’s Legal Service Queensland and the QPUE provided submissions to the Commission that recommended reduced paperwork for police.⁴¹⁶

Similarly, the QPS endorsed an approach of reduced paperwork, and acknowledged that the inefficiency and frustration felt amongst police about paperwork was due, in part, to issues within the QPS internal document systems.⁴¹⁷

The QPS should also investigate the use of Protective Services Group Officers to assist with the service of Protection Orders in limited situations, which might include when the respondent has not previously had a Protection Order made against them and are not considered to be high risk.

Barriers to streamlining administrative processes also exist outside the QPS’s direct control, such as processes required under the *Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012* including, for example, in relation to service of Protection Order applications.⁴¹⁸

At a hearing, Assistant Commissioner Codd provided an example where police officers in rural and regional Queensland might have to drive several hours to serve a document on a respondent and, if they are not present, police would need to undertake that task again at a later stage.⁴¹⁹

Both the QPS⁴²⁰ and the QPUE⁴²¹ have submitted that there could be a range of benefits associated with legislative change:

- To allow for the electronic service of DFV documents, although the QPS submitted that this would only be appropriate where the respondent is in the physical presence of the police officer and consents to the electronic service of the document.⁴²²
- To allow electronic signatures on documents filed with courts electronically.
- So that a PPN could be used as an application to vary a domestic and family violence order.
- To expand the availability and use of video recorded statements in Protection Order proceedings to remove the requirement for police to complete affidavits for an aggrieved person.

It is not possible for the QPS to achieve legislative reform on its own. It requires government commitment and endorsement by other departments who may have other competing priorities. Assistant Commissioner Codd reported that while there had been attempts by the QPS in the past to engage with the Department of Justice and Attorney-General to obtain legislative reform on the more time-consuming aspects of service delivery for police these attempts have largely been unsuccessful.⁴²³

All of these submissions have merit and are likely to result in streamlined processes without compromising the quality of QPS responses to domestic and family violence. The Commission encourages the Queensland Government to engage with the QPS to consider how such streamlining can be put into effect.

An example of the difficulties of cross-agency change includes the use of video recorded statements as recommended by the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence in 2015.⁴²⁴ A pilot program, in Magistrates Courts in only two districts, did not commence until September 2022, despite the QPS “*lobbying and lobbying and lobbying for this to occur.*”⁴²⁵

The Commission received submissions from frontline officers which spoke positively of the benefits of the use of video recorded evidence. Submissions received from domestic and family violence services also supported, in principle, the use of video recorded evidence, with informed consent from victim-survivors. Subject to a positive evaluation of the trial, the Commission considers that the trial should be expanded to further districts and makes a recommendation to this effect at the end of this chapter.

QLiTE

All operational police officers have QLiTE⁴²⁶ devices, which allow them to access information from the QPS databases when they are not in the station (where internet is available).⁴²⁷ In the 2021 survey of First Year Constables, participants reported that they were not fully trained in the use of their QLiTE devices.⁴²⁸ Further, there is difficulty using these devices in remote areas as they require internet access to function, and the 3G network is not sufficient for QPRIME to work effectively. For example, Sergeant Shane Smith from the Mt Isa police station, stated:

QLiTEs, they work in the township as in everything Telstra, like your mobile phones, that type of thing. But you go out bush, even just going 2 or 3ks outside the township, being you’re down - especially about 2ks out you’re down to 3G and the QLiTEs don’t really cope with 3G. You go 5ks out and you’ve got no coverage at all.⁴²⁹

Overwhelmingly, the most frequently mentioned gap related to understanding and use of computer-based reporting systems and documentation, including QLiTE, QPRIME ... all of which are used every day on the road.⁴³⁰

The Commission was told in hearings that Acting Assistant Commissioner Kelly was aware First Year Constables did not consider they were appropriately trained in QLiTE. As a result, the QPS was initiating a system to allow recruits to be trained with the devices at the Academy. He noted the QPS planned for this to occur with the September 2022 recruits, but “*we need to develop those sand pits where they can actually practice.*”⁴³¹

The QPS recently developed a new application for accessing QPRIME on their QLiTE devices, known as ‘QLiTE NextGen.’ The new application was developed out of technological necessity, to replace QLiTE Classic which was nearing ‘end-of-life’ and would be unusable.⁴³² The Commission was advised that the goal of implementing this next generation capability was to “*streamline processes and provide easier access to key information to aid the assessment of risk.*”⁴³³ An officer who responded to the DFV-Q Survey said:

However the ability to create Occurrences on QLITEs has reduced the time Officers need to be in the Station to complete the necessary administrative requirements.⁴³⁴

Enabling police to begin their paperwork on their QLITE has reportedly resulted in improved efficiency in attending to the administrative requirements of domestic and family violence matters. This type of initiative is positive and should continue, along with auto-population of fields where appropriate.

During the hearing on 4 August 2022, Assistant Commissioner Codd noted that a key indicator of progress and success in the QPS response to domestic and family violence would be a reduction in the complexity of processes and systems that general duties officers have to undertake when attending domestic and family violence incidents.⁴³⁵ He said:

An example of that would be the amendments we've made and improvements through the QLITE NextGen capability that allows the frontline to have more ready and easy-to-read access to information relating to relationships ... and the DV-PAF being loaded in that and being able to be responded to.⁴³⁶

However, QLITE NextGen is not without its issues. Some officers prefer the Classic version of QLITE and claim that QLITE NextGen is “clunky” and difficult to use.⁴³⁷ Senior Constable Michael Festing told the Commission that:

The way the app is designed, it doesn't work very well ... bouncing between information trying to complete the occurrence, it's very messy.⁴³⁸

Another officer said:

QLITE NexGen is a waste of time, stop looking to fix things that are not broken. It is just another thing taking my attention away from the job.⁴³⁹

This sentiment was also reflected in the QPS DFV-Q survey of police officers. Ratings for the NextGen version of QLITE are less positive than the Classic version:⁴⁴⁰

- 34.6% of officers agreed that QLITE Classic was intuitive and easy to use for managing and responding to domestic and family violence matters, and 17.7% disagreed
- Only 10.6% of officers agreed that QLITE NextGen was intuitive and easy to use, while 39.4% of officers thought it was not.

TOTAL 2022 QPS WORKFORCE RESPONSES

Strongly disagree Disagree Neither disagree nor agree Agree Strongly agree N/A

Q4. IT systems are intuitive and easy for managing and responding to DFV matters (rate for each).




Figure 21: QPS DFV-Q survey responses to QLITE – Classic and QLITE – NextGen

Soon after the Commission commenced, QPS officers demonstrated the NextGen system to the Commission and advised that, at that time, officers had the option of using QLiTE Classic or QLiTE NextGen on their devices, as a soft roll out of the new process to allow officers to adjust to the new system. Various features of QLiTE classic are being retired and officers are being forced to use the NextGen system.⁴⁴¹

A NEW ROLE OF VICTIM LIAISON OFFICERS

The Commission heard from people named as aggrieved persons in Protection Orders that they often feel that they are not supported by police officers once a Protection Order application is made and their matter is proceeding through the Magistrates court. They include occasions on which aggrieved persons have not been advised about the nature and likely length of court proceedings, upcoming court dates and whether the aggrieved is required to attend, and the availability of support services to assist aggrieved persons through the proceedings.

The Commission heard from many QPS members that their workload is such that it is difficult to also support aggrieved persons by keeping them informed of the nature and steps involved in court proceedings, including updating them about court dates. This issue is not one which can be rectified by more training for police officers about the importance of supporting aggrieved persons through the court processes. On the basis of the evidence heard by the Commission, a failure to support aggrieved persons in this way is often caused by a lack of time and capacity rather than a lack of understanding.

Under-resourcing of the organisation's ability to respond to domestic and family violence is considered in this Part, but also in Part 3 of this Report. Material considered in Part 3 demonstrates that it is quite clear that many police officers do not consider they have the time and capacity to respond to domestic and family violence callouts on a shift, let alone maintain an ongoing level of support for aggrieved persons once their matters proceed through the courts.

The Commission accepts that under-resourcing of the organisation's ability to respond to domestic and family violence means that, often, an aggrieved does not receive an appropriate level of support as their Protection Order proceedings progress through the courts. The Commission also accepts that police officers often simply do not have the capacity to provide this support.

Nonetheless, that support is an important part of the organisation's response to domestic and family violence. Court proceedings can be daunting, confusing and protracted. A lack of support for an aggrieved through that process can leave them feeling overwhelmed, isolated and further traumatised.

In the Commission's view, it would be appropriate to introduce the new role of Victim Liaison Officers to support aggrieved persons through court proceedings, for Protection Order proceedings or Police Prosecutions Corps summary prosecutions. A police officer should provide the aggrieved with contact details for the relevant Victim Liaison Officer at the time a decision to proceed with an application or criminal offence is made. The support provided by a Victim Liaison Officer, if requested by an aggrieved, should include, at least, advice about the nature and likely length of the proceedings, ongoing court dates and whether the aggrieved is required to attend or not, and the availability of support services. The Commission makes a recommendation to this effect at the end of this chapter.

CONCLUSION

Police need effective recruitment, training, procedures, and systems in order to respond effectively to domestic and family violence. The more knowledge and skills that QPS members have in relation to domestic and family violence the better the QPS response will be.

Continual assessments of the resources available to support QPS members in their responses to domestic and family violence will be necessary to ensure the organisation is well-placed to provide the most effective support to its officers.

FINDINGS

- The current recruitment strategy needs to be strengthened to ensure the Queensland Police Service attracts applicants who will be best placed to respond effectively to domestic and family violence.
- Ongoing one on one training is a valuable learning tool. Appropriately qualified Field Training Officers are essential to ensure success in the First Year Constable training program.
- There are significant gaps in training in relation to domestic and family violence. The Queensland Police Service should resume its practice of engaging people with lived experience of domestic and family violence and specialist domestic and family violence advocacy groups or services to deliver face to face training. All officers in specialist domestic and family violence positions and supervising frontline junior officers should have specialist training in domestic and family violence.
- The Operational Procedures Manual as it relates to the investigation of domestic and family violence is difficult to follow in the field and should be amended.
- Police are finding the burden of paperwork associated with domestic and family violence overwhelming.
- Police are not always able to adequately support victim-survivors through court proceedings, including by providing information in a timely way. The introduction of Victim Liaison Officers would help to correct this.

Recommendation 11

Within 12 months, the Queensland Police Service review its recruitment strategy to ensure that it:

- values applicants who have an interest in domestic and family violence policing
- attracts applicants from a diverse range of backgrounds and experiences, particularly from rural and remote locations
- attracts applicants from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds, particularly First Nations peoples
- targets applicants with an interest in criminology, social work, counselling, or other relevant human services
- accurately reflects the role of police in responding to domestic and family violence.

Recommendation 12

Within six months, the Queensland Police Service engage the Queensland Human Rights Commission to:

- review the Queensland Police Service practices and procedures for recruitment of its members, including to identify any drivers of inequality within Queensland Police Service members
- provide consultation and advice to the Queensland Police Service to develop revised strategic and operational plans to increase diversity and inclusion of Queensland Police Service members, including to increase the recruitment and retention of women, culturally and linguistically diverse, and First Nations members. The strategic and operational plans be finalised within 12 months of the commencement of the engagement of the Queensland Human Rights Commission and be published on the Queensland Police Service website
- conduct an evaluation to measure the extent to which the objectives of the revised strategic and operational plans have been met within 24 months of the finalisation of the plan. The outcomes of the evaluation be published on the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Human Rights Commission websites.

Recommendation 13

Within six months, the Queensland Police Service develop and implement a requirement that Officers in Charge must appoint Field Training Officers who possess appropriate skills and experience and standards of integrity, including having:

- at least two years of operational experience
- no pending, current or previous domestic and family violence order history
- no complaints history of concern
- a demonstrated capacity to respond effectively to domestic and family violence
- a proven ability to develop suitable training skills.

Recommendation 14

Within 12 months, the Queensland Police Service engage people with lived experience and specialist domestic and family violence advocacy groups or services to deliver face to face training in relation to domestic and family violence at the Academy and for ongoing training.

Recommendation 15

Within three months, the Queensland Police Service develop and implement a procedure which requires Officers in Charge to ensure that all frontline officers who attend domestic and family violence occurrences meet with a designated senior officer to receive feedback in relation to a sample of their body worn camera footage at least every six months.

Recommendation 16

Within 12 months, the Queensland Police Service improve its training in relation to domestic and family violence by ensuring all relevant programs address:

- legal and evidentiary thresholds for the making of Protection Order applications and the laying of associated criminal charges
- required information that must be included in Protection Order applications, including how to address the question of why the order is necessary or desirable
- the differences between the evidence required for criminal proceedings and domestic and family violence civil applications
- the inherent seriousness of proven breaches of Protection Orders and the significance of breaches in proving a course of conduct

- the information that should be included in objection to bail affidavits when criminal charges are commenced and bail is opposed
- the considerations relevant to whether to commence criminal charges when considering what action to take in response to domestic and family violence
- the dynamics of power and control, and the need to view domestic and family violence as a pattern over time, when responding to, and investigating, domestic and family violence
- victim-centric, trauma-informed, approaches to responding to and investigating domestic and family violence (including clear definitions and explanations of such terminology)
- when to use, and how to access, interpreters when responding to and investigating domestic and family violence.

Recommendation 17

Within three months, the Queensland Police Service develop and implement a procedure which requires members in the following designated roles to undertake the specialist five-day domestic and family violence training:

- High Risk Teams
- Police Communications Centre
- District Duty Officers
- Officers in Charge
- Shift Supervisors
- Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators and Officers
- Domestic Violence Liaison Officers
- Members of the Domestic, Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Command.

The procedure should stipulate that persons already in those roles (in a permanent or acting capacity) complete the training within 24 months and persons appointed to those roles after the procedure is operational complete the training within six months of appointment.

Recommendation 18

Within 12 months, the Queensland Police Service review the adequacy of the Operational Procedures Manual to direct and guide police responses to and investigation of domestic and family violence. The review is to include the involvement of a representative group of frontline officers, including a sample of Sergeants and Senior Constables who lead in the field.

Recommendation 19

Within six months, the Queensland Police Service develop a pocket-sized checklist for use by officers responding to domestic and family violence which outlines the steps that must be undertaken when attending to a domestic and family violence occurrence.

Recommendation 20

Within 12 months, the Department of Justice and Attorney-General amend the *Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012* by repealing section 113(3)(c) of the Act.

Recommendation 21

Within 12 months, the Queensland Government provide, by necessary legislative amendment, that the video recorded evidence trial be expanded across the state, pending a positive evaluation of the trial.

Recommendation 22

Within 12 months, the Department of Justice and Attorney-General investigate the feasibility of amending the *Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012* to allow for electronic service of Police Protection Notices and Temporary Protection Orders in appropriate circumstances.

Recommendation 23

Within 12 months, the Queensland Police Service establish a dedicated district level Victim Liaison Officer scheme to support people named as aggrieved persons in Protection Order applications or related summary prosecutions by the Police Prosecution Corps by providing them with information about Protection Order proceedings, any summary prosecutions by the Police Prosecutions Corps, and facilitating access to support services.

The established scheme must include appropriate guidelines outlining functions; the induction, and ongoing training commitment; formalised partnership arrangements with victim advocacy and support services; and a 12-month post-establishment evaluation.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS

Increased diversity in recruitment will create a police service that is more reflective of the community, with officers who have strengths and experiences that will positively contribute to how police investigate domestic and family violence, and how victim-survivors are treated.

It is possible that revising recruitment strategies to proactively recruit women and people from diverse backgrounds may restrict some rights of other applicants, such as recognition and equality before the law (s 15 HRA) but it is considered justified as a necessary and proportionate response to the need to better respond to victim-survivors. The involvement of the Human Rights Commission in implementing a proactive strategy to recruit women and culturally and linguistically diverse members will help ensure that any potential limitations of human rights of men that may arise, such as recognition and equality before the law (s 15 HRA), or equal opportunity considerations under the *Anti-Discrimination Act 1991* (Qld) are considered and justified in the recruitment strategy.

Further training for all officers and intensive training for officers in specialist positions, with input from people with lived experience and domestic and family violence advocacy groups, will ensure a victim-centric, trauma-informed approach to investigating domestic and family violence. The training will be supported by amendments to the Operational Procedures Manual, reviews of body worn camera footage and standards for Field Training Officers to ensure that First Year Constables are educated about domestic and family violence and have an appropriate level of supervision when they leave the Academy.

The combined effects of these recommendations will elevate a number of personal human rights of victim-survivors that are engaged when domestic and family violence is prevented or disrupted including recognition and equality before the law (s 15 HRA), right to life (s 16 HRA), right to liberty and security (s 29 HRA), protection for victim-survivors and families (ss 17 and 26 HRA) and cultural rights (ss 27 and 28 HRA).

The potential extension of the Video Recorded Evidence trial recognises the need to lessen the trauma and disadvantage experienced by victim-survivors during the court process, elevating their rights of recognition and equality before the law (s 15 HRA).

Recommendations 21 and 22 will streamline administrative processes around domestic and family violence applications and Police Protection Notices. The current processes are unnecessarily time consuming and repetitive. Simplifying the administrative processes will allow police more time to respond to and investigate domestic and family violence, elevating the human rights of victim-survivors outlined above.

ENDNOTES – PART 2

- 1 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July [p 5: para 20].
- 2 Exhibit 1.1, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 3: para 18].
- 3 Exhibit 37.3, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Cameron Ian Harsley, Tender Bundle U, tendered 18 August [pp 13–14].
- 4 Exhibit 1.1, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 4: para 25].
- 5 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane, [p 45, line 33 – p 46 line 22].
- 6 Commitments were also made to explore data-linking opportunities with Queensland Health to respond to the impact of non-lethal strangulation: Queensland Government, *Third Action Plan of the Domestic and Family Violence Prevention Strategy 2019-20 to 2021-22* (September 2019) [p 11].
- 7 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Attachment D (Domestic and Family Violence Strategy), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022.
- 8 Neil Greenfield, *Queensland Police Service Strategic Review* (Final Report, 6 December 2019).
- 9 Neil Greenfield, *Queensland Police Service Strategic Review* (Final Report, 6 December 2019) [p 4].
- 10 Neil Greenfield, *Queensland Police Service Strategic Review* (Final Report, 6 December 2019) [p 6].
- 11 Neil Greenfield, *Queensland Police Service Strategic Review* (Final Report, 6 December 2019) [p 7].
- 12 Neil Greenfield, *Queensland Police Service Strategic Review* (Final Report, 6 December 2019) [p 8].
- 13 Neil Greenfield, *Queensland Police Service Strategic Review* (Final Report, 6 December 2019) [p 9].
- 14 Neil Greenfield, *Queensland Police Service Strategic Review* (Final Report, 6 December 2019) [p 10].
- 15 SDRP is now known as the Service Delivery Program (SDP), but QPS members still use the terms interchangeably.
- 16 Exhibit 37.3, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Cameron Ian Harsley, Tender Bundle U, tendered 18 August 2022 [p 8: para 44].
- 17 Transcript of proceedings, Police Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 18 August 2022, Brisbane [p 2058, lines 32–37].
- 18 Letter to the Commission, 15 September 2022, provided by QPUE in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 15.001, Item 1, requested 8 September 2022.
- 19 QPUE letter to Assistant Commissioner Cameron Harsley, 12 March 2021, provided by the QPUE in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 15.001, Item 2, requested 8 September 2022 [p 2].
- 20 Confidential, Commission of Inquiry Submission 377, 27 August 2022.
- 21 Working for Queensland Survey – Queensland Police Service, conducted by the Public Service Commission, 2021.
- 22 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 18 August 2022, Brisbane [p 2059: lines 16–31].
- 23 Working for Queensland Survey – Queensland Police Service, conducted by the Public Service Commission, 2021.
- 24 Transcript of proceedings, Mark Ainsworth, 27 July 2022, Brisbane [p 1080: lines 22–32] (emphasis added).
- 25 Exhibit 27.6, Statement of Ian Leavers, Tender Bundle Q, tendered 5 August 2022 [p 4: para 19].
- 26 Queensland Police Union of Employees, Closing submissions to the Commission of Inquiry, 25 August 2022 [para 3].
- 27 For example, the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland recommended that the QPS increase the number of district Domestic and Family Violence Coordinators based on a rigorous assessment of demand and appropriate allocation and resourcing of these positions across the state (Recommendation 135). They also recommended that the QPS reinstate the Domestic and Family Violence State Coordinator at a suitable level to effectively support these Coordinators, address the disconnect between policy and practice to engender a consistent approach to the policing response, monitor performance and drive the future direction of policing domestic and family violence with a view to improving practice (Recommendation 136): Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence, *Not Now, Not Ever: Putting an End to Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland* (Report, 2015) [p 42].
- 28 Culture Change Strategy: QPS culture in relation to domestic and family violence, 23 April 2019, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.011, Item 2.1, requested 20 June 2022. This report was undertaken by Nous Consultancy to assess QPS culture in relation to DFV and a subsequent training and coaching program to support culture change. It made multiple recommendations relevant to the resourcing of domestic and family violence to the QPS including that officers are appropriately trained, remote regions have access to specialist resources, and that QPS should “review the resources available to effectively manage and respond to DFV matters to ensure members of all ranks and regions can access the necessary and appropriate support”.
- 29 Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce, *Hear her voice: Report 1 – Addressing coercive control and domestic and family violence in Queensland* (Report One, December 2021) [p 162].
- 30 Explanatory note and further response to email dated 26 July 2022, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.010, requested 17 June 2022.
- 31 Explanatory note and further response to email dated 26 July 2022, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.010, requested 17 June 2022 and NTP 2.040 requested 16 August 2022.
- 32 Queensland Police Service, *Experts gather to discuss domestic and family violence policing* (Web Page, 15 June 2021) <<https://mypolice.qld.gov.au/news/2021/06/15/experts-gather-to-discuss-domestic-and-family-violence-policing/>>.
- 33 Executive Briefing Note: Demand Reporting – Domestic and Family Violence, 2 August 2022, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.040, Item 1a, requested 15 August.
- 34 Queensland Police Service, Closing submissions to the Commission of Inquiry, Attachment B, 22 August 2022.
- 35 Queensland Police Service, Closing submissions to the Commission of Inquiry, Attachment ‘DV Summary’, 22 August 2022.
- 36 Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, *Report on Government Services 2022* (Productivity Commission Report, 25 January 2022) [pt C, s 6].
- 37 Transcript of proceedings, Constable Kate Gersekowski, 12 July 2022, Brisbane [p 241: lines 5–22].
- 38 Transcript of proceedings, Constable Andrea Hughes, 12 July 2022, Brisbane [p 250: lines 11–16]; Exhibit 17.01, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure M (Summary of interviews conducted on 1 July 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 39 Based on data provided by Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement NTP 2.002, requested on 2 June 2022.
- 40 Queensland Treasury, *Service Delivery Statements Queensland Police Service 2021–22* (2021); Queensland Treasury, *Service Delivery Statements Queensland Police Service 2022–23* (2022).
- 41 Queensland Government, *Performance Management Framework, Service Delivery Statements: Performant Statement, Better Practice Guide* (April 2017).
- 42 ‘Police Commissioner’s vow after Doreen Langham Inquest’, *The Scott Emerson Drive Show* (4BC Radio, 29 June 2022) <<https://www.4bc.com.au/police-commissioners-promise-following-doreen-langham-inquest/>>.
- 43 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 18 August 2022, Brisbane [p 2031: lines 2–15].
- 44 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 18 August 2022, Brisbane [p 2032: lines 8–40].
- 45 Queensland Government, *Performance Management Framework, Service Delivery Statements: Performant Statement, Better Practice Guide* (April 2017).
- 46 Audit Office of New South Wales, *Performance Audit: Police responses to domestic and family violence* (Report, April 2022) [p 16].
- 47 Audit Office of New South Wales, *Performance Audit: Police responses to domestic and family violence* (Report, April 2022) [p 32].
- 48 Audit Office of New South Wales, *Performance Audit: Police responses to domestic and family violence* (Report, April 2022) [p 32].
- 49 Audit Office of New South Wales, *Performance Audit: Police responses to domestic and family violence* (Report, April 2022) [p 32].
- 50 Victoria Police, *Annual Report 2021-2022* (2022) [p 16].
- 51 *Inquest into the deaths of Doreen Gail Langham and Gary Matthew Hely* (Coroners Court, Deputy State Coroner Bentley, 27 June 2022) [pp 131–134].
- 52 Exhibit 37.2, Statement of Commissioner Katarina Carroll, Attachment E (Email sent by Commissioner to Queensland Police Service dated 26 February 2021), Tender Bundle U, tendered 18 August 2022.
- 53 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July [p 3: para 8].
- 54 The Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Unit was established in 2015, initially as part of the Community Contact Command and, following an internal organisational restructure in 2020, the Road Policing and Regional Support Command: ‘Organisational Structure’, *Queensland Police Service* (Web Page, 12 January 2022) <<https://www.police.qld.gov.au/organisational-structure/regional-operations/road-policing-and-regional-support-command>>.
- 55 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 18 August 2022, Brisbane [p 1981: lines 39–45].

56 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Attachment D (Queensland Police Service Domestic & Family Violence Strategy 2021-2023), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 5].

57 Resource Allocation Committee submission endorsed 17 March 2021, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.042, Item 2, requested 22 August 2022.

58 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 15: lines 10–36].

59 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 11: lines 2–20; p 16: lines 35–42].

60 Other roles are focused on liaison with Victim Assist Queensland, police referrals and mental health.

61 Interviews with members of the Command took place on 19 and 21 September 2022.

62 Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence, *Not Now, Not Ever: Putting an End to Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland* (Report, 2015).

63 Exhibit 39 (D23), Summary of interviews with DFVPU Command members on 19 and 21 September 2022, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

64 Exhibit 39 (D23), Summary of interviews with DFVPU Command members on 19 and 21 September 2022, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

65 Exhibit 39 (D23), Summary of interviews with DFVPU Command members on 19 and 21 September 2022, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

66 Exhibit 39 (D11), DFV deep dive powerpoint presentation, 12 May 2021, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

67 Exhibit 39 (D9), ELT meeting minutes from 25–26 March 2021, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

68 Exhibit 39 (D11), DFV deep dive powerpoint presentation, 12 May 2021, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

69 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 6 October 2022, Brisbane [p 2273: lines 18–37].

70 Resource Allocation Committee submission endorsed 17 March 2021, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.042, Item 2, requested 22 August 2022.

71 For example: Exhibit 39 (D13), Email from Assistant Commissioner Codd to Deputy Commissioner Linford, 30 September 2021, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022; Exhibit 39 (D15), Assistant Commissioner Codd’s diary extracts, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022 [pp 1–5].

72 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 18 August 2022, Brisbane [p 1998: lines 24–28].

73 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 13: lines 7–25].

74 Confidential submission, Commission of Inquiry Submission 391, 29 August 2022 [p 2].

75 Exhibit 39 (D12), Board of Management Submission for 29 June 2021, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

76 Exhibit 39 (D12), Board of Management Submission for 29 June 2021, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022 (emphasis added).

77 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 45: lines 15–31].

78 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 45: lines 33–47].

79 Women’s Legal Service Queensland, Closing submissions to the Commission of Inquiry, 24 August 2022.

80 Queensland Police Service, Closing submissions to the Commission of Inquiry, 22 August 2022.

81 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 6 October 2022, Brisbane [pp 2294–2295].

82 Exhibit 39 (D20), Email from Assistant Commissioner Codd to Deputy Commissioner Linford, 14 September 2022, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

83 Midpoint Review Snapshot Update – DFVPU Command, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.078, Item 2, requested 20 October 2022.

84 Explanatory note and urgent out of session WAS submission, 13 October 2022, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.075, Item 3, requested 12 October 2022.

85 Urgent out of session WAS submission, 13 October 2022, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.075, Item 3, requested 12 October 2022.

86 Other resources include two positions for DFVCS in Brisbane Communications and two positions for Mental Health.

87 For example: Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 4 August 2022, Brisbane [p 1507: lines 21–47].

88 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 69: lines 19–28].

89 Exhibit 36.5, Intelligence Assessment – Domestic and Family Violence in the Torres Strait and the Northern Peninsula Area (current as at 30 June 2021), Tender Bundle T, tendered 9 August 2022.

90 Exhibit 39 (E4), Response to NTP from Warren Campbell, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

91 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 4 August 2022, Brisbane [p 1507: lines 40–47].

92 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 4 August 2022, Brisbane [p 1507: lines 21–27].

93 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 4 August 2022, Brisbane [p 1517: lines 4–47].

94 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 4 August 2022, Brisbane [p 1510: lines 2–31].

95 Exhibit 39 (E4), Response to NTP from Warren Campbell, Tender Bundle W, tendered 5 October 2022.

96 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 6 October 2022, Brisbane [p 2302: lines 29–32].

97 Exhibit 1.1, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 3: para 21].

98 Those priorities being: Victim/Survivor Protection, Perpetrator Accountability, Our People, Community Confidence and Integrated Relationships.

99 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 45: lines 8–13].

100 For example: Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 45: lines 8–13]; Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Ronald Martain, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 4: para 15].

101 Operation Tango Alessa Evaluation Report, December 2021, provided by Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.005, Item 6, requested 14 June 2022.

102 Operation Tango Alessa Evaluation Report, December 2021, provided by Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.005, Item 6, requested 14 June 2022.

103 Operation Tango Alessa Evaluation Report, December 2021, provided by Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.005, Item 6, requested 14 June 2022.

104 Operation Tango Alessa Evaluation Report, December 2021, provided by Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.005, Item 6, requested 14 June 2022.

105 The THReT tool was designed by the Child Abuse and Sexual Crime Group to identify sexual offenders.

106 Operation Tango Alessa Evaluation Report, December 2021, provided by Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.005, Item 6, requested 14 June 2022.

107 Exhibit 1.1, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Brian John Codd, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 6: para 41].

108 The Advisory Group’s current members include Assistant Commissioner Codd and representatives from the Women’s Legal Service Queensland, Red Rose Foundation, Queensland Center for Domestic and Family Violence Research, Multicultural Australia, Queensland Family and Child Commission and DV Connect.

109 ‘Expert group assembled to advise police on domestic and family violence’, *Queensland Police Service* (Web Page, 9 November 2021) <<https://mypolice.qld.gov.au/news/2021/11/09/expert-group-assembled-to-advise-police-on-domestic-and-family-violence/>>.

110 Exhibit 1.1, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Brian John Codd, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 6: para 42].

111 Domestic and Family Violence Advisory Group meeting minutes, 9 November 2021, provided by Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.022, Item 1, requested 7 July 2022.

112 Domestic and Family Violence Advisory Group meeting minutes, 8 February 2022, provided by Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.022, Item 1, requested 7 July 2022.

113 For example, Act for Kids, ANROWS, Micah Projects, DV Connect, WWILD, Red Rose Foundation.

114 Red Rose Foundation, Commission of Inquiry Submission 194, 7 July 2022 [p 3].

115 WWILD Sexual Violence Prevention Association, Commission of Inquiry Submission 158, 24 June 2022 [p 15].

116 ‘Family Violence Reform Advisory Group’, *State Government of Victoria* (Web Page, 22 July 2021) <<https://www.vic.gov.au/family-violence-reform-advisory-group>>; ‘Victims of Crime Commissioner’, *ACT Human Rights Commission* (Web Page) <<https://hrc.act.gov.au/victims-support-act/victims-of-crime-commissioner/>>.

- 117 Exhibit 18.2, Professor Silke Meyer, *Expert Report – Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (17 July 2022), Tender Bundle L, tendered 28 July 2022 [pp 3–4]; Exhibit 15.2, Statement of Emma Wilson, Tender Bundle I, tendered 21 July 2022 [p 2].
- 118 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (2018).
- 119 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022).
- 120 Five out of the seven regions recorded negative responses at or above 50% (the regional average for 2022 was 53.9% as compared to 31.0% in 2018). Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022).
- 121 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022).
- 122 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022).
- 123 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022 [p 10: para 33].
- 124 Transcript of proceedings, Emma Wilson, 25 July 2022, Brisbane [p 940: lines 1–8] (emphasis added).
- 125 Transcript of proceedings, Sergeant Neil Gardner, 11 June 2022, Brisbane [p 125: lines 4–13].
- 126 Transcript of proceedings, Emma Wilson, 25 July 2022, Brisbane [p 941: line 37 – p 942: line 4].
- 127 Exhibit 1.3, Statement of Sergeant Neil John Gardner, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 5: para 42].
- 128 Exhibit 1.3, Statement of Sergeant Neil John Gardner, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 5: para 41].
- 129 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022 [p 7: para 22].
- 130 There are also provisions within the OPMs to nominate regional domestic and family violence liaison officers (DVLOs). While these are not formal positions, an OIC of a region or command if they believe such an appointment would improve police efficiency and provide a better service to the community. An OIC may delegate this duty to another officer within their station in addition to their substantive duties: Queensland Police Service, *Operational Procedures Manual*, Chapter 9: Domestic Violence, 7 October 2022 [s 9.15.2].
- 131 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 June 2022, Brisbane [p 109: lines 20–25].
- 132 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 June 2022, Brisbane [p 94: line 31 – p 95: line 25].
- 133 Vulnerable Persons Training Audit, April 2021, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.004, Item 5, requested 14 June 2022.
- 134 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022) [p 44].
- 135 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure E (Summary of interviews conducted on 29 June 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 136 An OIC may delegate this duty to another officer within their station. Should they do so, the OIC is then responsible for the performance and supervision of the nominated officer and should allow them adequate time and resources to be able to perform these tasks.
- 137 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 June 2022, Brisbane [p 122: lines 18–26].
- 138 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022 [p 9: paras 29–30].
- 139 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure D (Summary of interviews conducted on 21 June 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 140 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure D (Summary of interviews conducted on 21 June 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 141 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure I (Summary of interviews conducted on 27 June 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 142 Women's Legal Service Queensland, Closing submissions to the Commission of Inquiry, 24 August 2022 [p 16].
- 143 Report for coroner, 24 March 2020, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.009, Item 1, requested 17 June 2022.
- 144 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 June 2022, Brisbane [p 106: lines 20–24].
- 145 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Attachment H (Queensland Police Service District Domestic and Family Violence Coordinator Position Description), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022.
- 146 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 2: para 6; p 5: para 20].
- 147 Crime and Misconduct Commission, *Policing Domestic Violence in Queensland: Meeting the challenges* (Report, March 2005).
- 148 Crime and Misconduct Commission, *Policing domestic violence in Queensland; meeting the challenges*, March 2005 [p 83].
- 149 Coroner John Hutton (Coroners Court of Queensland), *Findings of inquest into the death of Noelene Marie Beutel*, delivered 17 November 2014.
- 150 Coroner John Hutton (Coroners Court of Queensland), *Findings of inquest into the death of Noelene Marie Beutel*, delivered 17 November 2014 [p 6].
- 151 Coroner John Hutton (Coroners Court of Queensland), *Findings of inquest into the death of Noelene Marie Beutel*, delivered 17 November 2014 [p 7].
- 152 Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence, *Not Now, Not Ever: Putting an End to Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland* (Report, 2015) [p 40].
- 153 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Attachment H (Queensland Police Service District Domestic and Family Violence Officer Position Description), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022.
- 154 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 107: lines 4–15].
- 155 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 107: lines 17–28].
- 156 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 10: para 40].
- 157 Exhibit 5.1, Statement of Acting Assistant Commissioner Mark Kelly, Tender Bundle B, tendered 12 July 2022 [p 29: para 146 onwards].
- 158 Transcript of proceedings, Sergeant Neil Gardner, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 126: lines 29–42].
- 159 Transcript of proceedings, Sergeant Neil Gardner, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 126: lines 4–5].
- 160 Transcript of proceedings, Sergeant Neil Gardner, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 129: lines 16–29].
- 161 Transcript of proceedings, Sergeant Neil Gardner, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 130: lines 12–19].
- 162 Transcript of proceedings, Sergeant Neil Gardner, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 134: lines 1–4].
- 163 Transcript of proceedings, Sergeant Elise Feltham, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 143: lines 12–14].
- 164 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022) Annexure J (Summary of interviews conducted on 28 June 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 165 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure J (Summary of interviews conducted on 28 June 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 166 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure J (Summary of interviews conducted on 28 June 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 167 For example, on 27 September 2022, members of the Commission attended the Police Communications Centre. At that time, only one officer was on shift and there were over 75 active domestic and family violence jobs for attention.
- 168 Transcript of proceedings, Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 23: lines 32–46].
- 169 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [pp 102–103].
- 170 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 103: lines 7–19].
- 171 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 6: para 22].
- 172 Exhibit 1.4, Statement of Sergeant Elise Feltham, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 3: para 19].

- 173 Exhibit 1.1, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Brian Codd, Attachment A (Action Item Table 21/22), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 6].
- 174 Exhibit 1.1, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Brian John Codd, Attachment B (DFVVPV Capability Maturity Assessment), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022.
- 175 Exhibit 1.1, Statement of Assistant Commissioner Brian John Codd, Attachment B (DFVVPV Capability Maturity Assessment), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 1].
- 176 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Attachment J (DFVVPV Capability Framework), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022.
- 177 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 108: lines 6–11].
- 178 Transcript of proceedings, Commissioner Katarina Carroll, 18 August 2022, Brisbane [p 1984: lines 36–40].
- 179 Transcript of proceedings, Sergeant Elise Feltham, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 144: lines 1–13, 30–36].
- 180 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Sergeant Neil Gardner, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 5: para 42].
- 181 Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Women's Legal Services North Queensland, Commission of Inquiry Submission 200, 8 July 2022.
- 182 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Sergeant Neil Gardner, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 5: para 41].
- 183 Anonymous statement, taken on 13 July 2022 [p 5: paras 23, 25] (emphasis added).
- 184 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022) [p 49].
- 185 Exhibit 1.4, Statement of Sergeant Elise Feltham, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 7: para 42].
- 186 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022 [p 23: para 94]. This document is subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 187 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Sergeant Neil Gardner, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 3: para 26].
- 188 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022) [p 16].
- 189 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022) [p 46].
- 190 Exhibit 27.7, Statement of Rosemary O'Malley, Tender Bundle Q, tendered 28 July 2022 (emphasis added).
- 191 Exhibit 7.4, Statement of Sergeant Michael Read, Tender Bundle D, tendered 13 July 2022.
- 192 Micah Projects, Commission of Inquiry Submission 198, 8 July 2022 [p 8].
- 193 IFYS, Commission of Inquiry Submission 70, 20 June 2022.
- 194 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022) [p 49].
- 195 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022) [p 49].
- 196 Exhibit 18.2, Professor Silke Meyer, *Expert Report – Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (17 July 2022), Tender Bundle L, tendered 28 July 2022 [pp 3–4].
- 197 Australian National Research Organisation for Women's Safety, *Accurately identifying the 'person most in need of protection' in domestic and family violence law* (Research Report, Issue 23, November 2020) [p 84].
- 198 Australian National Research Organisation for Women's Safety, *Accurately identifying the 'person most in need of protection' in domestic and family violence law* (Research Report, Issue 23, November 2020) [p 84].
- 199 Australian National Research Organisation for Women's Safety, *Accurately identifying the 'person most in need of protection' in domestic and family violence law* (Research Report, Issue 23, November 2020) [p 84].
- 200 Exhibit 27.6, Statement of Ian Leavers, Tender Bundle Q, tendered 21 July 2022 [p 14: para 66].
- 201 Exhibit 27.6, Statement of Ian Leavers, Tender Bundle Q, tendered 21 July 2022 [p 14: para 66].
- 202 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure J (Summary of interviews conducted on 28 June 2022) and Annexure K (Summary of interviews conducted on 29 June 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. These documents are subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 203 Audit Office of New South Wales, *Performance Audit: Police responses to domestic and family violence* (Report, April 2022).
- 204 Audit Office of New South Wales, *Performance Audit: Police responses to domestic and family violence* (Report, April 2022) [p 14].
- 205 Victoria Police, *Code of practice for the investigation of family violence* (Edition 4, Version 1, 2022) [pp 29–31].
- 206 Victoria Police, *Code of practice for the investigation of family violence* (Edition 4, Version 1, 2022) [p 29].
- 207 'Family and Sexual Violence', *Tasmania Police* (Web Page) <<https://www.police.tas.gov.au/what-we-do/family-violence/>>.
- 208 'Police Emergency Services', *Tasmanian Government: Safe at Home* (Web Page, 10 June 2020) <<https://www.safeathome.tas.gov.au/services/emergency/>>.
- 209 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Attachment J (Domestic and Family Violence and Vulnerable Persons Units – Capability Framework), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 4].
- 210 Specifically in Brisbane, Caboolture, Cairns, Cherbourg, Ipswich, Logan/Beenleigh, Mackay and Mount Isa/Gulf. An additional three HRTs will be rolled out over the next four years as part of the implementation of key recommendations from the Women's Safety and Justice Taskforce, *Hear her voice: Report 1 – Addressing coercive control and domestic and family violence in Queensland* (Report One, December 2021).
- 211 'Integrated service responses', *Department of Justice and Attorney-General* (Web Page, 2 August 2022) <<https://www.justice.qld.gov.au/initiatives/end-domestic-family-violence/our-progress/enhancing-service-responses/integrated-service-responses/>>.
- 212 Transcript of proceedings, Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, 11 July 2022, Brisbane [p 103: lines 28–41].
- 213 Transcript of proceedings, Emma Wilson, 25 July 2022, Brisbane [p 938: lines 16–28].
- 214 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 4: para 12].
- 215 The Level 3 is part of the broader Common Risk and Safety Framework in Queensland and is designed specifically for use by coordinated high risk multi-agency teams: Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women, Queensland Government, *Domestic and family violence: Common risk and safety framework* (Version 2, 17 October 2022) [p 37].
- 216 Queensland Police Service, *Operational Procedures Manual*, Chapter 9: Domestic Violence, 7 October 2022 [s 9.15-5].
- 217 It is well recognised that responses to DFV need to be based on an understanding of a pattern of behaviour rather focusing on isolated incidences, for example: Transcript of proceedings, Karyn Walsh, 25 July 2022, Brisbane [p 923: lines 39–47].
- 218 Women's Legal Service Queensland, Commission of Inquiry Submission 219, 8 July 2022.
- 219 Women's Legal Service Queensland, Closing submissions to the Commission of Inquiry, 24 August 2022.
- 220 Exhibit 17.1, Mark Ainsworth, *Report into interviews conducted with police officers and civilian officers in relation to the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (21 July 2022), Annexure J (Summary of interviews conducted on 28 June 2022), Annexure M (Summary of interviews conducted on 1 July 2022) and Annexure N (Summary of interviews conducted on 3 July 2022), Tender Bundle K, tendered 27 July 2022. These documents are subject to an Order for Non-Publication made on 27 July 2022 – see Exhibit C.
- 221 Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women, Queensland Government, *Evaluation of the integrated service response and high risk teams trial – 2019* (Summary of Key Findings, July 2019).
- 222 Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women, Queensland Government, *Evaluation of the integrated service response and high risk teams trial – 2019* (Summary of Key Findings, July 2019).
- 223 'DFV common risk and safety framework', *Department of Justice and Attorney-General* (Web Page, 20 October 2022) <<https://www.justice.qld.gov.au/initiatives/end-domestic-family-violence/our-progress/enhancing-service-responses/dfv-common-risk-safety-framework/>>.
- 224 Exhibit 1.2, Statement of Chief Superintendent Ben Martain, Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July [p 11].
- 225 Exhibit 1.11, Professor Mark Keibell, *Evaluation of the Domestic Violence Protective Assessment Framework for Reliability and Validity* (2019), Tender Bundle A, tendered 11 July 2022 [p 40].
- 226 Transcript of proceedings, Constable Andrew Sinclair-Ford, 13 July 2022, Brisbane [p 304: lines 10–22].
- 227 Micah Projects, Commission of Inquiry Submission 198, 8 July 2022; Domestic Violence Action Centre, Commission of Inquiry Submission 201, 8 July 2022.
- 228 Exhibit 18.1, Professor Heather Douglas, *Report to the Commission of Inquiry into Queensland Police Service responses to Domestic and Family Violence* (14 July 2022), Tender Bundle L, tendered 28 July 2022 [p 12].
- 229 Screaming Birds Consultants, *"Keeping Eyes on the Perpetrators" Multi-agency triage and case lead allocation (MATCLA) Sunshine Coast – Review* (Report, February 2022) [pp 19–25].
- 230 Family Safety Victoria, *Family Violence Multi-Agency Risk Assessment and Management Framework: A shared responsibility for assessing and managing family violence risk* (June 2018) [p 9].
- 231 New South Wales Police Force, *Code of practice for the NSW Police Force response to domestic and family violence* (2018) [p 19].

- 232 Government of South Australia, *Family Safety Framework: Practice Manual* (2013) [p 5].
- 233 Thomson Goodall Associates Pty Ltd, *Review of multi-agency models for multi-agency risk assessment and management and integrated service delivery* (Independent Report, Extracted summary, 2016) [pp 75–76].
- 234 Northern Territory Government, *Domestic and family violence risk assessment and management framework* (September 2020) [p 8].
- 235 Department of Communities (Child Protection and Family Support) *Family and Domestic Violence Unit, Government of Western Australia, Family and Domestic Violence Response Team: Operating Procedures* (September 2017) [p 5].
- 236 'Family Violence Intervention Program (FVIP)', *ACT Victim Support* (Web Page, 3 April 2018) <<https://www.victimsupport.act.gov.au/victims-of-crime-commissioner/fvip>>.
- 237 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [pp 12, 17].
- 238 Evaluation Report Project Hera, June 2019, provided by YFS in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 5.001, Item 1, requested 24 June 2022.
- 239 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [p 34].
- 240 Transcript of proceedings, Karyn Walsh, 25 July 2022, Brisbane [p 922: lines 20–23].
- 241 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022) [p 68].
- 242 Exhibit 18.2, Professor Silke Meyer, *Expert Report – Queensland Police Service responses to domestic and family violence* (17 July 2022), Tender Bundle L, tendered 28 July 2022 [pp 9–10].
- 243 Micah Projects, Commission of Inquiry Submission 198, 8 July 2022.
- 244 Exhibit 15.2, Statement of Emma Wilson, Tender Bundle I, tendered 21 July 2022 [p 1] (emphasis added).
- 245 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [pp 23, 25, 27, 34].
- 246 Exhibit 15.2, Statement of Emma Wilson, Tender Bundle I, tendered 21 July 2022 [p 2].
- 247 Transcript of proceedings, Emma Wilson, 25 July 2022, Brisbane [p 939: lines 25–37].
- 248 For example, a trial was funded between August and December 2021 in the Logan area with The Centre for Women & Co.
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- 251 Micah Projects, Commission of Inquiry Submission 198, 8 July 2022 (emphasis added).
- 252 Rosemary O'Malley, Meeting with the Commission of Inquiry, held on 29 June 2022.
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- 254 Heather Lovatt, Liane McDermott, Michaela Pieterse, Silke Meyer, *Review of the Effectiveness of P.R.A.D.O. (Caboolture)* (Report, February 2021) [p 16]. This approach was also previously evaluated in 2011.
- 255 Heather Lovatt, Liane McDermott, Michaela Pieterse, Silke Meyer, *Review of the Effectiveness of P.R.A.D.O. (Caboolture)* (Report, February 2021).
- 256 BDVS also co-locates a DFV social worker in a VPU.
- 257 Micah Projects, Commission of Inquiry Submission 198, 8 July 2022 [pp 4–5].
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- 259 Transcript of proceedings, Karyn Walsh, 25 July 2022, Brisbane [pp 919–920].
- 260 Deputy State Coroner Jane Bentley (Corners Court of Queensland), *Findings of inquest into the death of Hannah Ashlie Clarke, Aaliyah Anne Baxter, Laianah Grace Baxter, Trey Rowan Charles Baxter, and Rowan Charles Baxter*, delivered on 29 June 2022 [p 165].
- 261 The Centre for Women & Co., Commission of Inquiry Submission 153, 25 June 2022 [p 8].
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- 263 The Centre for Women and Co., Commission of Inquiry Submission 153, 25 June 2022.
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- 265 Exhibit 27.7, Statement of Rosie O'Malley, Tender Bundle Q, tendered 5 August 2022 [p 3: para 6].
- 266 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [p ii].
- 267 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [p 34].
- 268 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [p 34].
- 269 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [p 36].
- 270 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [p 36].
- 271 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [p 36].
- 272 Molly Dragiewicz, Jeffrey Ackerman and Casey Cale, *Pilot Evaluation Study Domestic Violence Advocate Colocation at two Queensland police stations* (Final Report, 20 July 2022) [pp ii–iii].
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- 275 Jess Rodgers et al, *Evaluation of an Embedded Specialist Domestic Violence Worker: A Partnership between Queensland Police Service and Domestic Violence Action Centre* (Report, April 2022) [p 73].
- 276 Jess Rodgers et al, *Evaluation of an Embedded Specialist Domestic Violence Worker: A Partnership between Queensland Police Service and Domestic Violence Action Centre* (Report, April 2022) [p 74].
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- 278 Jess Rodgers et al, *Evaluation of an Embedded Specialist Domestic Violence Worker: A Partnership between Queensland Police Service and Domestic Violence Action Centre* (Report, April 2022) [p 77].
- 279 Nous Group, *QPS DFV-Q findings report* (29 August 2022) [pp 4–16]. See Appendix F: Survey Analysis of this Report for greater detail.
- 280 Queensland Police Service, *Longitudinal Study of 2021 Recruits* (Final Report, 14 January 2021) [p 8].
- 281 Queensland Police Service, *Longitudinal Study of 2021 Recruits* (Final Report, 14 January 2021) [p 9].
- 282 Queensland Police Service, *Longitudinal Study of 2021 Recruits* (Final Report, 14 January 2021) [p 9].
- 283 HRD response, provided by the Queensland Police Service in response to the Commission Requirement, NTP 2.038, Item 5, requested 12 August 2022.
- 284 'Diversity and Inclusion', *Queensland Police Service* (Web Page, 15 March 2022) <<https://www.police.qld.gov.au/units/police-recruiting/diversity-and-inclusion>>.
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- 286 The vetting phase involves assessment of any prior criminal, traffic, or domestic violence related histories.
- 287 Office for the Minister for Public and Corrective Services and Minister for Fire and Emergency Services, Queensland Government, 'Record Police Budget, record number of Police Recruits sworn in' (Media Statement, 30 June 2022).
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- 289 Transcript of proceedings, Acting Assistant Commissioner Mark Kelly, 12 July 2022, Brisbane [p 170].
- 290 G E Fitzgerald, *Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct* (Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council, 29 June 1989) [p 246].
- 291 Transcript of proceedings, Professor Heather Douglas, 28 July 2022, Brisbane [pp 1177–1178].
- 292 Transcript of proceedings, Professor Heather Douglas, 28 July 2022, Brisbane [p 1178: lines 42–43].
- 293 Transcript of proceedings, Professor Heather Douglas, 28 July 2022, Brisbane [p 1180].
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