OFFICER B

Officer B became a police officer in 1991. His service history includes:

1992 – 1997	Constable
1999	Senior Constable, General Duties
2001	Senior Constable, Child Protection Investigation Unit
2002	Acting Sergeant, Child Protection Investigation Unit
2005	Senior Constable, Community Beat Officer
2007 – 2009	Senior Constable, Road Policing Command
2010	Sergeant, Road Policing Command
2010 – 2015	Acting Senior Sergeant (Officer in Charge), Road Policing Command
2015	Sergeant (Officer in Charge), Road Policing Command
2017 – 2018	Acting Senior Sergeant (Officer in Charge), Road Policing Command
2018	Acting Senior Sergeant, Tactician
2020	Sergeant, Road Policing Command
2021	Sergeant, Education and Training Office
2022 (July)	Sergeant, Tasking and Coordination Centre

His disciplinary history includes:

1995 – 1996	Released information from QPRIME to a person to assist in their personal civil litigation (reported in 2000; temporary reduction in salary)
2005	Accessed prohibited, non-official and pornographic-explicit websites over an extended period (external internet access was revoked, temporary reduction in salary)
2012	Member of the public complained that a police officer on a bike had sped and crossed double lines. The Professional Practice Manager tasked Officer B to investigate. Officer B was the driver – he identified this conflict of interest and denied wrongdoing. The investigator told the complainant the 'probable identity' of the driver had been determined, but if he did speed, it would have been in the course of his duties, and so the complaint could not be proven (No Further Action, however was reminded to be aware of public perceptions)
2016	Plagiarised an essay submitted in a Management Studies in Policing 2 unit as part of a Management Development Program (managerial guidance, exclusion from MDP for 1year, requirement to undertake academic integrity learning)
2017 – 2019	Perpetration of DFV against his wife and children, unauthorised access to QPRIME, leaving his firearm unsecured, and breaches of a protection order – see below

Officer B married 'Z'. They have children together.

In October 2018, Z's mother reported to QPS that Officer B had perpetrated DFV against her and their children. She also alleged that he had accessed confidential information on QPRIME unlawfully, and regularly failed to store his QPS firearm at their home.

In December 2018, Z called 000 to attend her home. Officer B met police at the end of the street and provided his version of events: that he and Z had argued, and she had kicked him, and he restrained her by 'taking hold of her and putting her on the floor'. After he let her go, she went into another room and fetched his firearm. He said there had been a previous 'domestic incident', and that issues arose when Z was affected by alcohol (which he maintained was regularly).

Police later spoke to Z, who provided a similar account of what had happened (she described herself as having been 'feisty', and she said the firearm had not been stored properly). She was otherwise 'not forthcoming', and became abusive toward police in front of her children. Police applied for a protection order against Z.

In April 2019, in preparation for a hearing related to the protection order, Officer B used QPRIME to conduct searches about his DFV-related occurrences involving Z, and also the sudden death of his former partner in [redacted].

A review of Officer B's QPRIME activity between May 2018 and May 2019 revealed that (mostly off duty) 'he conducted a significant number of checks with respect to previous DV matters that he has been involved in; previous partners; associates and subsequent partners of his current and previous partners; and other family members'. He 'accessed and viewed forensic reports, officer notebook entries, intelligence reports, DV files, orders and associated paperwork for domestic violence matters to which he is an involved person'. In relation to Z specifically, this involved accessing material including disclosures and statements made by Z to the police about him, searching for records related to Z's car, and viewing Z's offender history. Of note is that searches conducted by him on 26 April support the allegation that he used QPRIME to try to locate Z while she was staying at a domestic violence shelter with the children.

In May 2019, Officer B accessed on QPRIME an intelligence report that alleged (by the manager of the domestic violence shelter) that he had been trying to locate Z. Officer B tried to contact the police officer who authored the intelligence report; instead, he spoke with another officer about whether he should record in QPRIME that that was untrue.

Z successfully privately applied for a temporary protection order against Officer B. Soon after, and in the context of the ongoing QPRIME usage investigation, he was issued a stand down notice.

In July 2019, after an argument between Officer B and Z that saw her throw pantry items at him and abuse him, police applied for an urgent temporary protection order against Z. Officer B applied to vary that order in November 2019 to accommodate their attempts at reconciliation, which followed Z having withdrawn her application for a temporary protection order.

In January 2020, the Department of Child Safety removed the children from their home for a period. Officer B (not Z) had restricted access to his children.

In February 2020, Officer B pleaded guilty to having breached the temporary protection order in June 2019 by twice attending his house, which Z had been staying at with the children without him. He was sentenced to a 9month Good Behaviour Bond with a $500 recognisance, No conviction was recorded.

Later that month, in the context of ongoing investigations, and while Officer B was on bail for a charge of computer hacking and misuse (detailed above), Officer B was contacted by a Sergeant from VPU. She told him she had not finished her investigation, but she would not be applying for a protection order against him because there was insufficient evidence to justify it. Officer B prepared a transcript of this conversation and provided it to the Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs, complaining that this information had 'just been ignored' by the Department.

In March 2020, Z privately applied for a temporary protection order against Officer B. A temporary order against Officer B was made several days later. An order, to expire in 2025, was made against Officer B in August.

On the same day in August, Officer B pleaded guilty to computer hacking and misuse as detailed above. He was sentenced to a $5000 fine. No conviction was recorded.

In November 2020, Officer B was disciplined for his unauthorized use of QPRIME between May 2017 and May 2019, for failing to secure his firearm in December 2018, and for having breached the protection order in June 2019. The sanctions included 6 months of probation, a temporary reduction in salary, a reprimand, and a Professional Development Strategy that included requirements to complete training on a variety of topics and participate in mentoring.

In December 2020, the stand down notice was revoked.

Between March and April 2021, Officer B breached the protection order four times by speaking with Z for extended periods in time despite a condition prohibiting contact. In May 2022, Officer B was notified that he is to be disciplined for this; the sanction was a wholly suspended short period of community service. Officer B requested that the sanction include a formal transfer to the position he occupied; since June 2021 he had been employed at the Education and Training Office, where he fulfilled the role of [redacted]. He wrote to the decision maker that he had 'actively contributed' to the training team, and used his 'broad and extensive experience to mentor and develop junior officers'. There was, however, no vacancy at the Education and Training Office.

On 16 July 2022, Officer B was transferred to the District Tasking and Coordination Centre.